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ABSTRACT
This thesis concludes that Soviet expenditures in Indochina,
particularly Vietnam, have significantly reduced assets and
options available to the USSR in Europe. Economic, military,
and political expenditures are assessed. Tradeoffs between
the Soviet Union's Indochina resource commitments and European
limitations are established. Based on these tradeoffs, three
policy options for the United States in South-East Asia are
formulated -- hardline, low key, and minimal involvement. A
"low key" option, with emphasis on diplomatic and economic
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I. INTRODUCTION
Soviet interests and capabilities have become truly
global in the last twenty years. Russia has the ability,
either directly or through proxies, to support national
interests anywhere on earth. A recent example involves
alleged Soviet support for the leftist insurgents in El
Salvador, providing arms and other material through Cuba.
In addition to clandestine activities, the Soviets signed
ten treaties of friendship and cooperation between 1971
and 1978 with nations ranging from Angolia in Africa to
Vietnam in Indochina. These treaties have allowed the
USSR to gain access to regions previously beyond its
reach and increased its stature as a superpower.
The Soviets' prime theater of interest, however, re-
mains Europe. Eastern Europe has served as an invasion
route into Russia twice in this century and today the
world's two most powerful military alliances face each
other in Central Europe.* Europe is the only place where
Soviet and American ground forces stand in direct confront
ation. One measure of the dominance of Europe in Soviet
interests is the fully equipped and combat ready divisions




stationed in Eastern Europe as opposed to those stationed
in the central Asian republics or on the Chinese border.
The Soviets have committed the largest proportion of
their human and material resources to meet the challenge
they perceive in Europe. Peripheral contingencies, however,
such as Afghanistan, occasionally demand significant resource
commitments. The extent to which these peripheral contin-
gencies demand Soviet resources necessarily reduces assets
and options available for Europe.
This thesis analyzes the goals of the Soviet Union in
Vietnam and the effects on those goals of the interests
acquired and the policies pursued in Vietnam. The type
and amount of economic aid provided by the Soviets to
Vietnam, Laos, and Kampuchea is examined, as well as the
military assistance provided to those three countries. The
political benefits flowing from the Soviet programs are
noted, as well as the costs to their policies and invest-
ments in their main theater of interest, Europe.
The role of Soviet Southeast Asian policies is then
assessed in the context of Soviet global commitments and
the proportion of their assets that they have been willing
to commit to Southeast Asia. Finally, an analysis is offered
regarding the interests, policies and goals of the Soviets in
Southeast Asia, especially as concerns the formation and exe-
cution of American policy.

A. METHODOLOGY
Soviet and Vietnamese goals in Indochina are discussed
and contrasted in the first chapter to determine the basis for
their relationship and to assess the degree to which the
Soviet's policies seem to be successful. The goals were
determined by reviewing critical commentary on the region
since 1975 for the current goals and a number of historical
sources for determining past Soviet goals in Asia and the
region. Foreign Broadcast Information Service reports were
invaluable for these purposes.
The second chapter concentrates on determining the re-
sources committed by the Soviet Union to secure their goals
in Indochina and the relative cost of those expended resources
in terms of maintaining the Soviet empire, especially in
Europe. Tradeoffs between expenditures in Indochina and
Europe were determined using objective data where possible
and subjectively in non-quantifiable areas such as political
costs
.
The final chapter develops American policy options based
on the conclusions reached in Chapter II and the array of
interests and goals presented in Chapter I. The options
assume a certain set of interests and goals on the part of
the United States.

II. GOALS AND BENEFITS IN INDOCHINA
Soviet goals in Indochina are evaluated within the frame-
work of Soviet global security interests defined in Avigdor
Haselkorn's The Evolution of Soviet Security Strategy 1965-75 .
Looking at the Soviet Union as the heartland, his thesis is
that since the mid-sixties Russia has attempted to establish
a security network on its periphery divided into three regions:
Warsaw Pact, Middle East/Mediterranean, and South Asia/Far
East
.
Two crucial events precipitated a dramatic change in
Soviet security perception: the Cuban Missile Crisis and the
Sino-Soviet split. The Missile Crisis found the Soviets over-
extended and militarily lacking. Describing Mr. Khrushchev's
position, Arthur Schlesinger Jr. wrote, "Lacking conventional
superiority in the Caribbean, he could neither break the
blockade nor protect Cuba against invasion. Lacking strategic
superiority, Khrushchev could not safely retaliate elsewhere
in the world." [1978:528] The Russians determined never to
be caught so grossly inferior again and embarked on a major
buildup of conventional and nuclear armed forces that con-
tinues today.
The more potent event driving the Soviet strategy was
the Sino-Soviet split. The implications of the split extended
10

beyond immediate military and political goals. It signalled
the end of monolithic Communism and a flaw in the 'historical
processes' Communist's doctrine depends upon. As one analyst
characterized it, the "Sino-Soviet cleavage (is) one of the
truly significant events of the twentieth century." [Scalapino,
1972:94] Russia and China in effect returned to their more
normal historical relationship and, a point crucial for this
study, the Soviet Union faced the specter of a two front war.
"This specter had a profound impact on the political-
strategic perspective of the Soviet leadership." [Haselkorn,
1978:4] Although China is militarily backward in comparison,
Russia cannot ignor an adversary with a population of one
billion people and with which the Soviets have a 4800 mile
common border. Chinese possession of a nuclear intercon-
tinental ballistic missile force adds to Soviet fears today
and complicates future Soviet designs as China begins to
modernize
.
The Missile Crisis spurred a military buildup designed
to give the Soviets the wherewithal to support their goals
,
the Sino-Soviet split provided the clincher for Soviet stra-
tegic moves in Asia since approximately 1965. Soviet strategy-
can be described as a "long range, unified and coherent design
aimed at the establishment of a Soviet-sponsored collective
security system all along the periphery of the Soviet Union."
[Haselkorn, 1978 :vii] The Soviet aim is to prevent complete
11

encirclement by hostile nations while at the same time divert
ing the attention of its two major adversaries, China and the
United States, and if possible, lure them into confrontation.
The function of the interlinked regions is to provide
strategic mutual support both internally within each region
and between regions. Thus in the 1973 Arab- Israeli War the
Soviet Union provided rapid resupply of war materials to
their Arab clients from bases in the Warsaw Pact region.
The regions can offer defensive, offensive, or logistic
support based on the perceived threat and Soviet objectives.
Unlike the nations in the Warsaw Pact region, the Middle
East/Mediterranean and South Asia/Far East regions are not
under direct Soviet control. A potential threat to the
Soviets exists if the dominant nations in these areas lean
toward either the Western or Chinese position. Any decisive
political alignment away from the Soviet Union in these re-
gions might be interpreted by Russia as a step toward stra-
tegic encirclement. John Erickson interprets the Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan as an effort to prevent this en-
circlement. [February 1981:16-8] The cost of the Afghanistan
invasion, not yet fully accounted, underscores the importance
the Soviets attach to preventing breaches in their security
system.
Soviet global commitments are costly: thirty Soviet
divisions stationed in Eastern Europe alone. Eastern Europe
12

absorbs most of the fuel and raw materials exported by the
Soviets, returning less to the Soviet Union than could be
gained by sales on the world market. Military advisors and
equipment form an integral part of Soviet relations with
countries even nominally associated with their security
system. Indochina and Afghanistan are recipients of economics
aid and may require expanded support. My assumption is that
the Soviet Union has an important set of goals in each region
of commitment that justifies, in the leadership's mind, the
national burden of supporting them.
A. EVOLUTION OF INDOCHINESE COMMITMENT
From Lenin's time Soviet leaders have appreciated the
role of Asia in their 'historical struggle'. The Sixth
Communist International (Comintern) Congress held in 1928
produced a "Communist manifesto geared to the twentieth
century." [McLane , 1966:67] The document called for the
overthrow of "imperialism, of feudalism, and landlord
bureaucracy; the establishment of the democratic dictator-
ship of the proletariate and peasantry on the basis of
Soviets, expropriation of landowners ... nationalism of all
land, and establishment of revolutionary worker's and
peasants army." [Ibid., p. 67] The precepts of the mani-
festo were applied in Asia by Comintern agents from Korea
to Calcutta including such representatives as Nguyen Ai Quoc,




It is easy to overestimate Moscow's role in the revolu-
tions which have swept Asia since 1917. Except for Soviet
support of the Chinese in the 1920s, their contribution con-
sisted largely of rhetoric and a few zealous Comintern agents.
As Ho Chi Minh discovered in Vietnam, nationalism was a far
more moving ideal for the Asia masses than was Communism.
While Stalin was attempting to build socialism in one country,
Russia, and later when he prepared for war with the fascists,
the Soviet Union toned down even the rhetoric against colonial
powers such as Britain and France. Following World War II the
Soviet Union once again focused on Asia and the prospects of
damaging the capitalist nations through ferment in Asia.
Mao Tse-tung's successful revolution in China became the
beacon for Asian Communists after 1949. Chinese aid and in-
fluence in Vietnam was far greater than Moscow's in the 1950s.
Chinese aid to the Vietnamese directly contributed to their
momentous victory at Dien Bien Phu in 1954, the military suc-
cess which allowed the state of North Vietnam to come into
existence. Chinese influence was such that in 1951 Ho Chi
Minh stated that the successes of the Democratic Republic of
Vietnam were based on "the doctrines of Marx, Engels, Lenin,
and Stalin, and on the thought of Mao Tse-tung." [McLane,
1966:442]
Following the Sino-Soviet split the Vietnamese attempted
to maintain a somewhat balanced relationship with the estranged
14

powers. The Soviets began to figure Vietnam into their China
policy in the early sixties. By 1965 Soviet military economic
aid was greater than Chinese aid and had escalated the conflict
to the point that the United States committed troops to Vietnam
The Soviets may have hoped that the presence of American troops
would drive the Chinese into rapprochement with the Soviet
Union. As early as 1964 Mao had attempted to blunt Soviet
designs by refusing to allow Soviet aid to cross Chinese ter-
ritory. The American buildup forced him to reconsider and
overland deliveries were resumed in 1965; however, they slowed
considerably in the wake of the Cultural Revolution. [Parker,
1977:6]
The American drawdown following the Tet Offensive in 1968
lead to a change in the Chinese perception of what constituted
the major threat to their security. The Soviet Union was
viewed as the major new threat rather than the United States
and China began to change its external relationships to combat
the new threat. Although Soviet aid to Vietnam still passed
through China, the Chinese attempted to influence the
Vietnamese to use tactics that would not push the Americans
out too precipitously. The Soviet buildup on China's north-
ern border, begun in 1963, looked more ominous than the
threat receding on its southern border. The Soviet invasion
of Czechoslovakia, the first use of the so-called Brezhnev
15

doctrine, was seen by the Chinese as proof of the Soviet
aggressive intent. By 1969 China and the United States
were actively seeking rapprochement. [Parker, 1977:14]
American involvement in the two Vietnams overshadowed
the Soviet-Chinese moves, much as the Cold War clouded the
Sino-Soviet split. American power was removed from the
Indochinese equation in April 1975 and since that time
Soviet goals have become more clear and Chinese fears of
Soviet penetration into the region have been realized.
Failing to achieve rapprochement with the Chinese based on
the American threat in Vietnam, the Soviets now actively
support a threat to China by including the Indochinese
states in their collective security system.
B. SOVIET SECURITY SYSTEMS IN ASIA BEFORE VIETNAM
When Brezhnev announced the formation of an Asian col-
lective security system in 1969 there already existed a
series of Soviet ties with Outer Mongolia, North Korea,
and India to form the basis of the system. Some of the
ties were quite old and stable such as those with Outer
Mongolia, others required constant revitalization, like
those with India. Declared an independent state in 1924,
Outer Mongolia almost immediately aligned itself with the
Soviet Union. Soviet internal interference and the
Mongolian Communists were decisive factors in Mongolia's
political development. Soviet Foreign Minister Chicherin
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stated in 1925 "In Mongolia we have a government completely
directing its policy along the lines of close rapprochement
with the USSR." [Clubb, 1971:214] Since 1963 Outer Mongolia
has provided a base for six Russian divisions as part of the
buildup on the Chinese border. [Kaplan, 1981:271]
North Korea is not a Soviet satellite although a recip-
ient of significant amounts of Soviet aid. Sharing a common
border with both China and Russia, North Korea has attempted
to maintain balanced relations between the two while garner-
ing as much help for itself as possible. In July 1961 the
North Koreans signed very similar treaties of cooperation
and mutual assistance with both Moscow and Peking. [Clubb,
1971:452]
North Korea, because of its attempt to balance relations
with China and the Soviet Union, plays little actual role
but great potential in the Soviet effort to contain China.
The Soviets do not maintain troops in North Korea nor have
they supplied their most sophisticated weaponry; however,
the Soviets have supplied Mig 21 aircraft and have trained
many North Koreans in the Soviet Union. Given the right
conditions, the Soviet Union might provide North Korea with
the military resources to invade the South and distract
American attention.
The Soviet Union has actively courted other nations on
its periphery such as Burma, Pakistan, and Afghanistan.
17

Burma attempts to maintain a neutral position between the
great powers but faces an active Communist insurgency
problem. The Burmese Communist Party has received more
support from China than from the Soviet Union and it is
unlikely that Burma will become a willing member of the
Soviet system. Within the Burmese Communist Party it is
only the "older" elements of the party that lean toward
the Soviet Union. [Scalapino, 1975:182]
The Soviets supported India against Pakistan in their
1965 conflict but today attempt to maintain friendly rela-
tions with both countries. Pakistan maintains good rela-
tions with China and barring internal eruptions should not
become a Soviet ally. The Soviet goal is to avoid alienat-
ing Pakistan completely.
Afghanistan is a key country in the Soviet security
system. In December 1978, the Soviet Union and Afghanistan
signed a Treaty of Friendship, Good Neighbor liness and
Cooperation. Article 8 of the treaty stated that the con-
trolling parties "will facilitate the development of coop-
eration among Asian states and the establishment of. .
.
mutual confidence among them and the creation of an effec-
tive security system in Asia." [ Survival , March/April 1979:
92-93] This article provided the Soviets some form of legal
support for their later aggression. The limits of long
range Soviet goals in Afghanistan are not clear. A
18

Pakistani report that 30,000 Soviet families have settled in
Afghanistan's northern provinces indicates the Soviets do
not intend to leave in the near future. [ Grand Strategy ,
1 April 1982]
Today Indochina must be added into the existing Soviet
security framework in Asia. Some important questions are:
1. What current interests in Indochina do the Soviets have?;
2. What policies have the Soviets implemented to secure
their interests?
C. RECENT SOVIET INTERESTS AND POLICIES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
Soviet interest in Southeast Asia, Indochina in partic-
ular, is directly linked to Soviet-Chinese relations. Soviet
aid to North Vietnam expanded greatly in the early to mid-
sixties in an effort to increase the American commitment to
the point where China felt threatened and sought rapproche-
ment with Russia. [Parker, 1977 ;1] When America decided to
reduce its commitment and Sino-American rapprochement be-
came imminent in 1969, Soviet strategy became increasingly
and openly based on containment of China, Soviet aid to
Vietnam remained substantial, and Soviet interest in Vietnam
as a member of its recently announced collective security
system increased.
After the unification of Vietnam, the facade of Communist
solidarity gave further evidence of withering away. Le Duan,
Vietnamese Communist Party First Secretary, visited Peking in
19

September 1975. No joint communique was issued following the
visit. The Chinese pressed him to drop close relations with
the Soviets and acknowledge the danger of Soviet hegemony;
however, the Vietnamese still perceived the United States to
be the major threat to the region. [Loescher, 1979:135] In
October Le Duan went to Moscow and signed a long and short
term aid agreement. In January 1976 the Soviets agreed to
participate in forty aid projects in Vietnam. Early in 1976
the Chinese-Vietnamese dispute over the Paracel Islands in-
tensified and it became evident Vietnam had chosed align-
ment with Russia at the risk of hostility with China. [Parker,
1977:33]
The Soviet Union had provided the military aid necessary
for North Vietnam to invade the South and could provide aid
to help Vietnam begin to build in peace. China, on the other
hand, was still recovering from the Cultural Revolution and
not able to provide substantial aid of any type to Vietnam:
China's weakness was an advantage to the Soviets.
Soviet interests were also served by the deterioration
of Vietnam's relations with China and Kampuchea between 1975
and 1978. Vietnam's invasion of Kampuchea, probably not
possible without Soviet aid, has allowed the Soviets to
expand their interests to all the Indochinese states. The
Soviets have advisors in Kampuchea and have begun to develop
naval facilities at two locations. [FBIS, 10 March 1982 :J1]
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Another result of the invasion of Kampuchea has been the
increased isolation of Vietnam from the Western and non-
Communist Asia world, particularly ASEAN,* increasing
Vietnam's dependence on Soviet aid. The invasion triggered
a Chinese attack on Vietnam proper, solidifying Vietnam's
anti-Chinese stance, lessening the influence of the pro-
Chinese elements in Vietnam's leadership, and making Soviet
support that much more important.
Vietnam's extreme dependence allows the Soviets some
leverage in using Indochinese territory to further their
global interests. Naval and air facilities used by the
Soviet military allow monitoring of American activity and
present a challenge to American interests in the Pacific
and Indian Ocean regions.
Soviet policy toward Vietnam since 1965 has been to
supply substantial amounts of aid in support of Vietnam's
goals with little known interference in internal North
Vietnamese affairs. The quid pro quo that has taken place
is in the name of fraternal association, more realistically
meaning that the divergence between Soviet and Vietnamese
goals has not yet been a serious source of conflict.
1 . Specific Soviet Goals
The Soviet Union has four generally accepted goals
in Southeast Asia:
Association of Southeast Asian States: Philippines
Thailand, Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia.
21

1. Contain China by offsetting Chinese influence in the
region, both in the Communist states and parties and
among non-Communist states;
2. Obtain facilities in the region to support Soviet
military force projection, especially naval
facilities
;
3. Gain acceptance as a power in Southeast Asia that
must be included as a necessary part of any settle-
ments or negotiations pertaining to the region;
4. Foster trade with the region and gain access to
raw materials. [(Scalapino, 1975:179) (Horn, 1973:494)
(Pike, 1979:1160)]
A fifth goal may be added to this list: 5. the Soviet
is attempting to establish strong state to state relations
with each of the Indochinese states with the aim of estab-
lishing a loosely held sphere of influence and as a hedge
against deteriorating relations with the Vietnamese.
a. Contain China
The goal of containing China and offsetting
Chinese influence is the most important to the Soviets.
A hostile Vietnam faces China with an unstable situation
on its southern border. The Soviets have been able to
exploit the regions traditional fear of China and, by
supplying Vietnam with the means of resistance, faced
China with a two-edged sword. Attacking Vietnam raises
regional fears of Chinese hegemony while inaction allows
the Vietnamese to consolidate their position in Laos and
Kampuchea, posing a long term security problem for China.
22

The Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation concluded
between the Soviet Union and Vietnam in 1978 represents the
capstone of Soviet efforts to secure Vietnam in their security
system. Article six of the treaty states:
"in case either party is attacked or threatened with attack,
the two parties... shall immediately consult each other with
a view to eliminating that threat, and shall take appropriate
and effective measures to safeguard peace and the security
of the two countries." [ Survival , 1979:41]
While well short of a military alliance, this article tied the
security interests of the two countries together at China's
expense. Vietnam's entry into the Soviet dominated Council
for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) insured that aid to
Vietnam would not be totally dependent on the Soviet Union,
aid explicitly offered in Article two of the treaty between
the two countries. The Soviets were able to include Vietnam
in their Asian security system while invoking the economic
resources of the Warsaw Pact region to help support the new
arrangement. [Pike, 1979]
b. Facilities
A military annex to the Soviet-Vietnamese treaty
was signed following the Chinese invasion of Vietnam. Al-
though the annex was not made public, [Pike, 1979:1163]
the use of facilities is quite probably linked to Soviet
aid. The French magazine Le Point reported that for dou-
bling economic aid from three to six million dollars per
day the Soviets gained unrestricted use of four former
23

American bases: Ton Son Nhut , Bien Hoa, Cam Ranh Bay, and
Da Nang. The Vietnamese deny any link between aid and base
rights. In January 1981 Vietnamese Foreign Minister Nguyen
i
Co Thach stated that Soviet use of Vietnam's territory was
justified because "we had the same enemies. The victories
of the Soviet Union were good for us. Ours were good for
it. We are linked by a common fight." [FBIS, 28 January
1981 :K4] In the same month he stated that the Soviets had
no bases in Vietnam and that none were being planned, how-
ever, he noted that future developments could alter the
plans
.
Despite the lack of formally announced 'bases'
the Soviets have been able to service combat ships in
Vietnamese ports and station TU-95 reconnaissance aircraft
at Vietnamese airfields. The number of Soviet aircraft
and ships using Vietnam as a stopover or basing point has
consistently risen since 1978. [Pike, 1979:1163-1166]
In addition to naval and air facilities the
Soviets have installed several communication and intelli-
gence gathering centers in Vietnam and Laos. The center
in Vietnam has capabilities similar to a complex in Cuba
and may monitor all communications in the area of the
South China Sea. A satellite communication receiving
station has been constructed in Laos "to meet the ever
increasing demands for communication between Moscow and
24

Vientiane." [FBIS, 16 February 1982:15] Perhaps an addi-
tional reason is to gain greater electronic access to
southern China and to act as a relay station between Moscow
and the main Soviet communication center at Cam Ranh Bay.
Soviet access to the landmass, waters, and air-
space of Indochina further their interest in containing
China and countering the United States in the Pacific and
Indian Oceans. The strategic implications of the Soviet
emplacement are important: turn around time for units de-
ployed to the Indian Ocean are greatly reduced; Soviet
naval units can easily operate in the South Pacific; naval
choke points such as the Straits of Malacca are within easy
range; Soviet aircraft can perform reconnaissance missions
along the south China coast or in the South China Sea;
strike aircraft, such as the Backfire bomber, could pose
a threat to China or other nations in the region; airlift
support of Vietnamese operations is easily accomplished.
This list is not exhaustive but it does underscore the
advantages the Soviets accrue from their military presence
in Indochina.
c. Acceptance as a Regional Power
The Soviet Union is accepted as a regional power,
but neither respected nor liked. The Soviets have had limited
success in achieving their goal of being consulted and involved
in any international settlement affecting the region. Soviet
25

ability to control events is questioned by the ASEAN nations
because, despite Soviet assurances that border violations
would not occur, three days before a June 1980 ASEAN Ministers
meeting a force of 200 Vietnamese troops attacked several
kilometers into Thai territory. Naturally, Soviet credi-
bility as a stabilizing power is weakened by such events.
Each of the ASEAN nations faces an internal insurgency claim-
ing association with Communism; none of the governments in
power wishes to form a close relationship with a major
Communist power such as the Soviet Union that might fuel
domestic instability.
Singapore Foreign Minister S. Dhanabalan summed
the ASEAN position at the ministers meeting, "Vietnam had
by a deliberate act allowed Indochina to become the cockpit
of the Sino-Soviet conflict... Their (Vietnam) entire strength
in the confrontation is derived from the Soviet Union." [FBIS,
17 June 1981:A2] Instead of turning to the Soviets, the
ASEAN nations have looked to the United Nations for a solu-
tion, supported the formation of a 'united front' of the
Kampuchean groups against the Vietnamese, and linked the
Soviets with the intransigent stance Vietnam has taken in
negotiations
.
Russia has provided enough aid to the three
Indochinese states to insure Soviet participation in most
major foreign policy decisions made by these states.
26

Soviet economic aid, advisors, and technical assistance is
crucial to all three. In return the Soviets have had dip-
lomatic support from the three in addition to growing stra-
tegic military access.
d. Trade and Access to Raw Materials
The Soviets would like to increase their trade
with the entire Pacific Basin region including Indochina
and the ASEAN nations. The Soviet ambassador to Thailand
has stated "Southeast Asia is now an area where there is
competition for natural resources." [FBIS, 29 January 1981:
J6] In Laos the Soviets have signed an agreement to help
extract tin ores and to build a tin refinery. In Vietnam
they have signed an accord calling for a joint oil explora-
tion enterprise. [FBIS, 22 June 1981:K5, 22 June 1981:13]
Trade and raw materials benefits are a long
term Soviet goal, but there is little evidence that these
potential benefits are a decisive factor in Soviet planning.
The Soviets are not in need of the raw materials and trade
offered by the region as much as other powers such as Japan.
Soviet gains in commerce in Indochina have not offset the
accompanying loss of trade with the ASEAN nations. [Robinson,
1980:24-25]
e. Form a Loose 'Sphere of Influence' Based
on State to State Relations
The Soviets have established direct relations
with the governments in Laos and Kampuchea. Soviet planning
27

groups work with their Laotian counterparts, Soviet military
advisors work with Laotian military units, and other groups,
such as the USSR-Laotian Friendship Association, foster direct
Soviet access to Laos. In February 1982 Assistant Defense
Minister and Chief of the Soviet General Staff Marshal Ogarkov
visited both Vietnam and Laos. In Laos Marshall Ogarkov in-
spected Laotian military units and spoke with Lao military
and civilian officials including President Souphanouvong, the
apparent number two man behind General Secretary Kaysone
Phomvihan. [FBIS, 12 February 1981:11-12] In March, Vice
Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union
Nikolay Baybakov visited Laos after visiting Vietnam, meeting
with the chairman of the Laotian Central Committee. The two
sides
:
"expressed their unanimity to coordinate the implementa-
tion of the state plans of the two countries, namely in
the economic and social construction fields which aim to
contribute to the Lao revolution in the national social-
ist defense and construction... this cooperation... will
also enhance and consolidate the existing friendship re-
lations and combative solidarity between the parties,
governments, and peoples of the two countries."
[FBIS, 5 March 1982:11]
Two aspects of the quote are significant: 1. the
stress placed on Soviet-Lao ties and; 2. the absence of any
reference to other Indochinese states, specifically Vietnam.
The report of Ogarkov' s visit likewise contained no mention
of Indochinese solidarity.
The rhetoric used by the Soviets to describe
their relations with Vietnam on the one hand and Laos and
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Kampuchea on the other differs. With Laos and Kampuchea the
Soviets have "friendship relations and combative solidarity"
whereas with Vietnam stronger ties are conveyed based on
"military solidarity and all-round cooperation." [Text of
Fifth Party Congress in FBIS, 9 April 1982, p. 11, 18] Despite
emphasis on their relationship with Vietnam, the Soviets are
attempting to foster stronger state to state relations with
the other two Indochinese states. Events in Cambodia high-
light more sharply Soviet diplomacy.
In late December 1981, Kampuchea Defense Minister
Pen Sovan and three associates were removed from their posi-
tions. The surprise firings were partially due to Sovan'
s
contention that the key to Kampuchea's future lie only in
the strengthening of solidarity with the Soviet Union.
Sovan's dismissal indirectly supports the position that the
Soviets are attempting to strengthen their influence in the
region by improving state to state relations with Cambodia.
Sovan was apparently removed without prior consultation with
the Soviets, severely straining Soviet-Vietnamese relations
and openly showing that Sovan's pro-Soviet stance was con-
sidered important by Moscow. [Chanda, 16 April 1982:18]
D. VIETNAMESE GOALS
1 . Internal Goals
The main internal goal of the Vietnamese Communist
Party is "to construct a modern socialist industrial state
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with a minimum of coercion in a context of agrarian poverty
and social division." [Turley, 1980:42] The Vietnamese must
integrate the recently conquered South with the relatively
socialized North and establish central control of the economy.
Improvements in agriculture are the first and primary
goals. In the first years after 1975 Vietnam suffered a
three million ton deficit in foodstuffs per year. Over two
million tons were imported from the Soviet Union and today
Vietnam still imports twenty percent of its foodstuffs from
Russia. [Pike, 1979:1161] Population growth has been faster
than the food production increases and by 1980 the rice
ration was down from the 15 kilogram per month per person
provided during the war to 8-10 kilos per month. [Thayer,
1978:221]
The problems plaguing agricultural production are
similar to those in the Soviet Union following the Revolution and
prior to Lenin's introduction of the New Economic Plan. Heavy
state taxes provide no incentive for the peasants to produce
more than they can consume, particularly in the South where
sixty percent of the peasants had been free land-holders at
the end of the war. [Turley, 1980:44-52] Pragmatic steps
taken by the VCP Central Committee have given the peasant
more rights to manage surplus production and in 1981 the har-
vest in North Vietnam, where the program was initiated, was
excellent. However, massive imports are still required to
keep the population fed at subsistence level. [Chanda, 8
January 1982:56-57] ~ Q

Industrial production of any type is a problem in
Vietnam. In 1979 the 6th Plenum of the Central Committee
announced that "if some types of state-produced goods can
now be better produced and developed by the handicraft and
artisan industry and private capitalists, they must boldly
be assigned to the latter. The organizational forms of
production must not be fixed." [Turley, 1980:52]
A major goal of the Vietnamese is to spur industrial
production. Vietnam has the worst balance of payments def-
icit of any country in the world. The exodus of refugees
has severely damaged industries such as fishing and coal
mining. Most of the 900,000 refugees who have fled the
country since 1975 have gone in fishing boats. The expul-
sion of ethnic Chinese removed most of the managers and
miners from the coal industry. Coal in particular is a
source of hard currency the Vietnamese desperately need.
The International Monetary Fund has suspended Vietnam's
drawing rights until the nation can prove the money is
being used for peaceful purposes and not to finance the
war in Kampuchea. [Wall Street Journal , 5 April 1982:25]
The aggregate effect of these economic woes is to increase
Vietnam's dependence on the aid provided by the Soviets.
Integrating North and South Vietnam is a major
goal. Severe problems exist because of the ethnic diver-
gences and the persistence of what the Vietnamese leaders
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call the pre-1975 way of thinking. The formation of New
Economic Zones greatly contributed to the exodus of the
'boat people', and the process of forming new zones has
been slowed considerably in the past few years. The reluc-
tance of the conquering Northerners to use the bureaucratic
skills of the Southerners was initially a problem. [Turley,
1980]
The principle obstacle to successful integration is
a lack of trained party cadres. The Soviet Union has been
instrumental in managing this problem by accepting thousands
of Vietnamese for technical and administrative training in
the Soviet Union. In 1979 there were an estimated 30,000
Vietnamese students and worker trainees in the Soviet Union
and another 6,000 in Eastern Europe. In April 1982 the
Vietnamese Minister of Labor praised the Soviet Union for
training "cadres, scientists, technicians, economic managers
. .
.
and skilled workers specializing in various economic
and technical sectors." [FBIS, 9 April 1981:K19]
Party problems continue to exist and were a major
topic of discussion at the Fifth Party Congress held in
March 1982. The VCP report to the Congress stated:
"The realities of the past few years have also clearly
shown the party's weakness and shortcomings in economic
and social leadership, as manifested in deficiencies
with regard to the implementation and centralization
of the party's lines in practical organizational capa-
city, in the style of leadership presenting features
not suited to the new stage."




Improving the performance of the party cadres is seen
as a crucial step in solving the other major problems. Inter-
nal steps have included non-violent purges and a massive
recruitment and training program. Technical and management
training provided by the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe satel
lites offer the only route presently available for Vietnamese




Vietnam's prioritization of external goals may change
in 1982-83 in light of indications the Soviets are either un-
willing or unable to provide as much support as they have in
the past. [Chanda, 16 April 1982:17-18] Unless Russo-
Vietnamese relations deteriorate drastically, however,
Vietnam's primary goal will remain the consolidation of its
current relations with neighboring Laos and Kampuchea. It
is an open question whether Vietnam seeks lasting dominance
over its neighbors or simply to remove any lingering threat
to its newly won independence.
The immediate goal is to secure recognition of the
Vietnamese installed government of Heng Samrin in Kampuchea.
Since Vietnam invaded Kampuchea in 1978, the ASEAN nations
have attempted to end Vietnam's occupation through U.N.
mediation. These efforts have failed because Vietnam
refuses United Nations participation and insists that
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representatives of the Heng Samrin regime be included in
direct negotiations- -confronting ASEAN with what amounts to
de facto recognition of the Phnom Penh regime.
Vietnam does desire a solution to the Kampuchea
problem because the current situation is very costly in
terms of manpower and material resources. Maintaining the
Samrin regime currently requires Vietnam to maintain a
180,000 man force in Kampuchea. The type of solution is
crucial because the Vietnamese are fearful that Kampuchea
could be used as a haven for organizing insurgencies among
Vietnam's minorities, therefore, the occupation may con-
tinue until that potential threat is no longer perceived.
[Turley, 1980:98]
The broader goal may be the creation of an Indochinese
Federation. The idea has been suggested by many free-world
writers and is not completely denied by the Vietnamese them-
selves.* Mention of a special relationship between the
Indochinese states was first seen in a 1976 visit of the Lao
Premier to Hanoi. In 1980, a Vietnamese economic planner
stated
:
"In a firm strategic position in which Vietnam, Laos
and Kampuchea are interdependent it is necessary to
In March 1982 interview, Vietnamese Foreign Minister
Nguyen Co Thach stated in relation to the three states: "In
the past there was solidarity and cooperation. This soli-
darity was of crucial importance in our struggle for inde-
pendence. It cannot be broken off just like that. Fate has
welded Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea together.
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combine the disposition of strategic regions with
economic regions and to regulate and distribute the
workforce and the population for building grain pro-
duction bases, industrial zones, infrastructures..."
[Chanda, 20 June 1980:28]
Provinces in Laos and Kampuchea have been linked with sister
provinces in Vietnam. The indication is that Communist social
engineering will apply to the resources of the entire Indo-
chinese peninsula, coupled with the Communist corollary of
central control.
The Federation is held together by the presence of
30-50,000 Vietnamese troops in Laos and 180,000 troops in
Kampuchea. Without Soviet aid it is difficult to imagine
how Vietnam could continue its occupation. The Vietnamese
have no munitions industry and few technicians and admini-
strators to spare.
Achievement of Vietnam's second cluster of external
goals, broadening its sources of aid and improving relations
with its non-Communist neighbors and the West, has been se-
verely hampered by their military ventures in Indochina.
The invasion of Kampuchea alienated many of Vietnam's
neighbors and brought a sharp reaction from the West. Nor-
malization with the United States, proceeding fairly smoothly
prior to the invasion, hinges on Vietnam's withdrawal from
Kampuchea. In June 1981 Secretary of State Alexander Haig
stated "The United States will not normalize relations with
a Vietnam that occupies Kampuchea and remains a source of
trouble to the entire region." [ New York Times , 21 June 1981:
A12] 35

Short of adjusting their primary goal, the Vietnamese
have made several efforts to improve relations with the non-
Communist world. In 1978 Premier Pham Van Dong toured the
ASEAN to improve Vietnam's image, offering to establish bi-
lateral relations. Demands to Thailand for the aircraft and
boats used in the 1975 evacuation were dropped, refugee and
economic agreements were signed, the treaties of friendship
were proposed. In the years 1977-78 Vietnam attempted to re-
involve the United States in Vietnam, dropping demands for
war reparations as a precondition for normalization and ask-
ing for aid on a humanitarian basis.* [Thayer, 1978:221-22 3]
The Kampuchean invasion aborted these early efforts
but Vietnam has attempted bilateral approaches several times
since 1978 and recently offered to conclude non- aggression
pacts with the separate ASEAN states. [FBIS, 19 February
1982:K6-7]
E . SUMMARY






1. Contain China 1. Improve agriculture
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One author reported President Nixon had previously of
offered 3.5 billion in reconstruction aid but the plan was
blocked by Congress. [Thayer, 1978:224]
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Gain access to facilities 2. Strengthen Party cadres
for military forces in order to strengthen
Establish itself as a economic and political
regional power controls
Access to trade and raw 3 * Increase industrial
materials production
Establish strong state to 4 ' Integrate and social-









3. Broaden sources of
aid
4. Improve relations with
Asian non-Communist
and Western states
Vietnam is in the uncomfortable position of having to
depend on the Soviets to help fulfill most of their internal
goals and their most important external goals. Improving
agricultural production and feeding the populace requires
Soviet aid in terms of farm equipment fertilizers, and food-
stuffs to feed the population. A crucial part of economic
development is the availability of people trained to manage
the tasks of an industrialized society. The Soviet Union
provides almost all the training available to Vietnam,
Vietnam's war making capability, and diplomatic support
for the Vietnamese goal of legitimizing the Samrin regime.
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Vietnam's dependence allows the Soviets to fulfill most
of their regional goals. Soviet efforts to establish state
to state relations with Laos and Kampuchea may, however, con-
flict with Vietnam's goals in Indochina. The Sovan incident
highlights the potential strain caused by that divergence.
Soviet goals already met could be jeopardized by closer rela-
tions between Vietnam and the non-Communist world. Reduced
economic dependence may bring the divisive factors of the
two alien cultures into play.
Although Vietnam appreciates Soviet aid, Vietnamese con-
sider the Russians to be more racist than other societies
and to have a gauling degree of cultural chauvinism. [Pike,
"Vietnam and the USSR," 225-256] Regardless of their dif-
ferences, the Vietnamese-Soviet relationship will continue
to be mutually beneficial unless Vietnam changes its stance
in Kampuchea or the Soviet Union curtails its support.
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III. COSTS OF EMPIRE
Soviet expenditures in Indochina must meet two criteria.
First, they must be sufficient to sustain Soviet credibility
as an ally and a regional power. The Soviets desire non-
Communist states such as the ASEAN nations to perceive the
USSR as a power willing and able to contribute to regional
development. Second, expenditures in Vietnam and throughout
Indochina must be related to the Soviet's ability to maintain
their commitments. Soviet Russia is constrained by limited
economic resources and many competing commitments.
The massive amounts of aid already provided to Vietnam
have not been used as efficiently as the Soviets had hoped.
[Chanda, 16 April 1982:18] In the past 18 months the Soviets
have had to attempt to rationalize their relationship with
Vietnam. Factors such as Poland's economic disintegration
and shortcomings in the Soviet economy have demanded a
closer accounting of all the costs of maintaining the Soviet
empire. Vietnam represents just one.
Three types of costs will be evaluated and related to






The Soviets and Vietnamese face an enormous task in de-
veloping Vietnam's economy. In 1975, the year North Vietnam
unified the country by force, Vietnam was an economic basket
case. There was little industrial production, virtually no
energy production, and dangerously reduced agricultural pro-
duction. Food, capital, and training were desperately needed.
The Soviet Union provided 1.2 billion dollars in aid the first
year after the war, including 2-3 million metric tons of food
required to meet the basic food needs of the population. In
Vietnam's first five year plan, 1976-80, the Soviet Union
pledged sixty percent of the 3.2 billion dollars required by
the plan. [Pike, 1979:1160-1165] Since 1976 the Soviets have
continued to provide significant amounts of aid to Vietnam
and also to Laos and Kampuchea.
Current estimates of Soviet expenditures in Indochina
range from three to six million dollars (equivalent) per day,
the majority going to Vietnam. [FBIS, 10 March 1982 :J1] The
total amount of expenditure may be much higher. In 1981 the
total amount of military aid was estimated to be between 900
million to 1.0 billion and economic aid between 4 and 6 bil-
lion dollars (see Table I). Most of these amounts represent
repayable loans at approximately 4 percent interest. The
immediate return to the Soviet Union is very small given
Vietnam's stunning trade deficit and underdeveloped resources.
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Vietnam possesses significant potential wealth. In the
early seventies the Vietnamese produced 3.5 percent of the
world's total rice crop and were capable of being a rice
exporter. Natural rubber, copra, citrus fruits, and other
commercially valuable crops can be grown in Vietnam. Tin,
zinc, and coal deposits exist that have not been fully ex-
ploited. The waters surrounding Vietnam, especially in the
South, include some of the best fishing areas in the world.
All of Indochina possesses valuable timber resources. The
problem is and has been that Vietnam does not have the means
to extract and fully use its resources. Before the Soviet
Union can realize any meaningful return on its economic
investment in terms of imports it must provide the means
and the training for Vietnam to extract its potential wealth
[Espenshade, 1980:30-45]
Soviet economic aid is targeted to build the Vietnamese
economy to the point where it can export some of its wealth
in useable form to the Soviet Union. This is not malicious
on the part of the Soviets; every nation with common sense
strives for the most favorable terms of trade possible.
Summarizing the aid program, the Soviet military attache to
Vietnam recently stated:
"The internationalism and fraternal sentiments of the
Soviets toward Vietnam are reflected in the assistance
given by the Soviet Union to Vietnam in building or
restoring nearly 100 projects including the biggest
ones in Southeast Asia such as the Binh hvdroelectric
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power plant on the Da River, the Pha Lai thermoelectric
power plant, the Bim Son cement plant, the Thang Long
Bridge on the Red River, and so forth."
[FBIS, 18 March 1982 :K9]
The scope of the aid program is indicated: electrical power
for industrialization, cement for construction, and bridges,
etc. , for improved transportation.
Building the power plants creates an infrastructure of
support and a number of trained workers. The Soviet sponsored
Tri A power plant located 70 kilometers (KM) northeast of Ho
Chi Minh city (Saigon) will employ 20,000 workers, require
many miles of railroad to be constructed, and create a new,
very large reservoir. The Soviets are providing the construc-
tion materials and the technicians, specialists and engineers
necessary to supervise the construction and train the workers.
[FBIS, 25 February 1982 :K3] Other areas of major Soviet in-
vestment are agriculture, energy resources, mineral extrac-
tion and other resources such as natural rubber, transportation
and communication, and consumer goods production.
Vietnamese and Soviet sources agree that developing agri-
culture is the most critical task facing Vietnam. The
Vietnamese Minister of Agriculture stated at the recent Fifth
Party Congress that the acceleration of production is most
"vital" and it was equally vital "that we accelerate the
scientific and technical revolution in agriculture."
[Minister of Agriculture Report, Nhan Dan , 8 April 1982:3]
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A Soviet commentator similarly stated "Agriculture remains
the most important thing for Vietnam at the present time."
[FBIS, Soviet Union
,
17 February 1982 :E2]
Technical development of Vietnam's agriculture relies ex-
clusively on aid from the Soviet Union and the East European
satellites. The Soviets have provided large amounts of farm
machinery and associated equipment including items such as a
completely furbished tractor plant located near Da Nang cap-
able of producing 150 units per year. [FBIS, 7 January 1981:
E9] The 1982 Soviet-Vietnamese Trade agreement specifies a
sizeable increase in the delivery of machinery and spare parts
plus other farming necessities such as nitrogen fertilizers.
[FBIS, 4 March 1982:E3]
The Soviets have supplied Vietnam with tons of machinery
and other equipment in an effort to raise the quantity of
natural rubber produced. Under Soviet guidance (or pressure?)
large tracts of previously uncultivated land have been dedi-
cated to rubber production with the goal of quickly raising
the amount available for export to the Soviet Union. [FBIS,
9 January 1981:K9; 5 March 1981:K11]
Raising Vietnam's food production is crucial to the
Soviets because the Soviets have little food to spare.
Vietnamese farmers have had little incentive to increase
production, at first because of the high state taxes and
later because, even when allowed to keep their surplus
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production, no goods were available to purchase. Pham Van
Dong's report to the Fifth Party Congress stated, "we should
consider agriculture the first front and must step up con-
sumer goods production to meet present urgent needs of every
day life." [FBIS, 22 April 1982 :K9] The Soviets have sup-
plied a quantity of consumer goods including cloth, ready
made clothes, shoes, etc., free. [FBIS, 12 February 1982 :K6]
The aid provided benefits to both nations because the con-
sumer goods help to raise agricultural production and thus
reduce Soviet food assistance. The emphasis on aid such as
the consumer goods, fertilizer more than foodstuffs, and
machinery to increase rubber production, is evidence of the
Soviet effort to rationalize their relationship with Vietnam.
Industrialization is severely hampered by Vietnam's lack
of energy sources. Water power potential exists in abundance,
and there are limited amounts of coal, oil, and natural gas.
Soviet aid to develop water- generated electrical power, such
as in the Da River project, has been discussed. Soviet aid
is perhaps even more important for Vietnam to extract its
other energy resources because of a complete lack of indig-
enous talent in the field of offshore oil and gas exploration.
In June 1981 the two countries signed a joint exploration
and exploitation agreement aimed at tapping offshore oil
and natural gas deposits. Nhan Dan hailed the agreement,
stating that "This cooperation has given birth to Vietnam's
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natural gas branch whose development plays a very important
role in socialist industrialization." [FBIS, 22 June 1981:
K5] Nguyen Lam, chairman of the Planning Commission, stated
that in 1982 Vietnam's first offshore well will be drilled.
The Soviets continue to supply 1.5 million tons of oil an-
nually, although Vietnam is attempting to cut imports be-
cause the price of Soviet oil keeps rising. [Chanda, 8
January 1982:13-14]
Transportation, industrial construction, and cultural
exchange represent the other major areas of Soviet aid.
Many bridges and roads have been constructed, rail lines
installed, and construction materials supplied. On 16
February 1982 the twenty-fifth anniversary of Soviet-
Vietnamese cultural exchange was marked by ceremonies held
in both the Soviet Union and Vietnam. The Soviets hailed
the occasion by presenting the works of Lenin translated
into Vietnamese. [FBIS, 17 February 1982 :K8]
Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach stated recently that
total Soviet aid for the period 1976-1980 reached the total
provided in the previous thirty years. [FBIS, 6 May 1982:
K8] The 1982 trade protocol between the countries con-
tinues to concentrate on developing Vietnam's self-suffi-
ciency while perhaps cutting back on the delivery of
foodstuffs
.
"In 1982 the USSR will continue deliveries of power
generating, mining and quarrying, transportation and
conveyance equipment, farm and roadbuilding machinery,
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lorries, oil products, nonferrous metals and rolled
nonferrous metal, sawn timber, cotton and other con-
sumer goods. A sizeable increase is to be made in
the deliveries of Soviet commodities imported for the
Vietnamese economy, particularly rolled iron and steel,
nitrogen fertilizers, and spare parts and machinery,
equipment and transport facilities."
[FBIS, 4 March 1982:E3]
In return the Vietnamese are expected to supply the Soviets
with growing quantities of natural rubber, fresh vegetables
and fruits, parquet blocks, coffee, tea, footwear, rugs and
other consumer goods. For the increased return, Thach
stated that total Soviet aid for the 1980-85 period will
increase fourfold over the 1976-80 amount. [FBIS, 6 May
1982:K1]
Laos and Kampuchea are also receiving increased amounts
of Soviet aid. Approximately 25,000 tons of construction
materials will be delivered to Laos in 1982 under the terms
of a recently signed Soviet-Lao agreement. [FBIS, 22 March
198 :I4] There is a Lao-Soviet protocol on economic, tech-
nical, and scientific cooperation under which a feasibility
study is being done by the Soviets to determine if an oil
pipeline running from Vietnam to Laos can be constructed.
[FBIS, 24 April 1981:12] The Soviets manage several other
projects in Laos and carry out goodwill projects such as
building schools and providing road construction material.
[FBIS, 1 July 1981:12] The Soviets also deliver oil and
some consumer products to Laos.
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In February 1981 the Soviet Union and Kampuchea signed
an economic aid agreement. Tractors, Vehicles, construction
equipment, and most recently 37 trucks have been turned over
to the Phnom Penh government. [FBIS, 18 February 1981 :H7;
2 March 1982 :H2] Overall, the aid given to Laos and Kampuchea
is significantly less than that afforded Vietnam. The amount
is growing and the trend between now and 1985 should clearly
show an increase in bilateral aid with the two smaller Indo-
chinese states. The economic return for Soviet investment in
these two countries will be extremely small for the foresee-
able future; Laos and Kampuchea suffer the same problems as
Vietnam to a far greater degree.
1 . Soviet Economic Costs in Perspective
Total Soviet economic aid to Indochina in the period
1976-81 was roughly four billion dollars.* This conservative
figure represents visible aid in terms of material delivered
and capital absorbed. There are many hidden costs such as
the advisors who fly and manage an airline operation in
Kampuchea and the Air Traffic Controllers who help manage
*
The figure is based on a total of 8.9 billion derived
from adding 1.2 billion dollars in 1976 [Pike, 1979] to the
total in subsequent years, graduating 1.2 by .1 per year to
1.5 in 1979. Pike provides the figure 1.9 for 1980 and
using current estimates I figured 1.6 billion total for
1981 using an average of 4.5 million per day. Economic aid
total was estimated using Pike's ratio of 45.55 economic ver-
sus military aid. [Pike, 1981]
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the airspace above Indochina. The funds spent to improve
facilities used by the Soviets and to construct new ones
also represent costs.
Naturally, resources expended in Indochina are not
available for other commitments. The economic shortfalls
of the socialist community exacerbate the problems of sup-
porting an economically weak state such as Vietnam, which
absorbs but does not contribute to the system. There is a
circular effect in that the Soviet Union makes demands on
East European countries to help support its empire, contri-
buting to the internal economic problems of those nations.
When an East European nation suffers economic problems, it
must turn to the Soviet Union, plagued with its own severe
economic problems, for assistance.
"The Vietnamese people sincerely thank the Soviet
Union and other Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (CEMA)
countries for their great assistance," hailed Nhan Dan, the
Vietnamese daily newspaper, in May 1981. CEMA members were
specifically congratulated for their part in constructing
the trans-Vietnam railroad. [FBIS, 27 May 1981:K7] As
early as June 1978 the East European countries had provided
significant aid to Vietnam: 700 tons of equipment for tele-
graph lines from Hungary; cement mixers from Bulgaria; com-
pressors and truck mounted cranes from the German Democratic
Republic (GDR) , and rails and diesel generating stations
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from Poland. [Pike, 1979] The GDR and Bulgaria continue to
supply considerable aid. In May 1981 the GDR signed a long-
term trade agreement with Laos in addition to an agreement
the GDR already had with Vietnam. The extent of East German
aid is difficult to estimate; some has been expended on
service-oriented projects such as bicycle repair shops.
[FBIS, 13 March 1981:K17] Bulgaria has signed an agreement
with Kampuchea and Vietnam for developing agriculture, for-
estry, and mineral exploration. Thousands of Vietnamese
students are enrolled in Eastern European schools for tech-
nical and management training.
Eastern Europe can ill afford to support Indochina's
development. The oil crises of the 1970s and the centrally
planned mismanagement of many Eastern economies have ren-
dered them extremely vulnerable. The Eastern bloc countries
recently had to provide 800 million dollars worth of credit
to support Poland. Vietnam will not be capable of contri-
buting to CEMA for many years, because its goods are not
readily adaptable to European markets and its need for
development capital is immense.
The situation in Eastern Europe poses several prob-
lems for the Soviets. Faltering satellites such as Poland
are an embarrassment to the Soviet system. Poland's 25
billion dollar Western debt has stymied the flow of credit





23 April 1982:28] The Poles are forced to turn to
the Soviets and satellite neighbors for raw materials and
other products they can no longer afford to purchase from
the West.
Other bloc countries such as Hungary and Czechoslovakia
are openly expanding the private sector to help meet the de-
mands of their public and to support their economies. The
Czechs allow individual entrepreneurs to perform services
such as dressmaking, carpentry, and barbering for profit --
small steps, but ones that were banned following the 1968
invasion. Hungary plans to boost the private share of its
retail economy to about five percent. [Wall Street Journal ,
22 April 1982:34; 12 May 1982:28] Hungary recently became
the second Bloc country to apply for membership in the
Western-controlled International Monetary Fund (IMF). Its
membership application has been approved, allowing Hungary
to increase its drawing rights on Western capital. [Wall
Street Journal , 6 May 1982:32]
The billions of dollars worth of Soviet resources ex-
pended in Indochina could be used (a) to bolster failing eco-
nomies such as that of Poland before they reach the critical
stage or (b) assist other bloc countries facing economic stag-
nation in order to prevent alteration of their economics in
ways the Soviets could not help but disapprove. Eastern
Europe already absorbs most Soviet foreign aid, so commitments
such as Vietnam and Cuba absorb whatever is left over.
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In 1982 the Soviet Union is expected to suffer its
lowest growth rate since World War II. Many industries are
performing well below the state-determined goals. The Soviet
news agency TASS has reported shortfalls in nonferrous metals,
building materials, light industry, and milk and bread pro-
duction. The grain crop has been poor for several years.
1981 was a disaster with an estimated shortfall of 80 million
tons. Some reports indicate the Soviets will not be able to
import enough to make up for the failure because transporta-
tion and storage problems limit the amount of imported grain
the nation can manage. The end result will be a reduction
in the meat available and more hardships for the Soviet con-
sumer. The government has candidly warned the public to ex-
pect serious shortages. [Wall Street Journal , 8 April 1982:
25; 26 April 1982:1]
Although the Soviets have relatively less Western debt
than the East European nations, it is still substantial:
7.3 billion in 1970, 8.5 billion in 1980. [Anderson, 12
April 1982:38] The Soviets are using gold for collateral
on their loans and selling large quantities of gold to get
hard currency -- a process that lowers the price of gold and
the value of Soviet reserves. [Wall Street Journal , 25 March
1982:26]
Vietnam's absorption of resources from the Soviets
and bloc countries must be considered in the context of the
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bleak economic situation of the entire socialist community.
Vietnam's need for agricultural development and industrial
modernization parallels the major shortfalls of the Soviet
economy. If the Soviets have a difficult time feeding them-
selves, how can they feed the Vietnamese?*
Far Eastern Economic Review reports that many East
European diplomats in Asia have not tried to hide their "lack
of enthusiasm for the Vietnamese involvement in Kampuchea or
their unhappiness at being called upon to foot the bill."
[Chanda, 29 February 1980:12] Their complaints probably
refer not to directly financing the war and occupation but
to the increased economic aid required to make up for the
Soviet aid diverted to the war effort.
2 . Economic Tradeoffs
Two possible tradeoffs exist between Soviet options
in Eastern Europe and their commitments in Indochina:
1. Eastern Europe's technical, financial and mili-
tary support of Indochina limits East European willingness
and ability to support other Soviet projects;
2. Soviet resources expended in Indochina are not
available to support the USSR's overriding interest in main-
taining dominance in Eastern Europe.
The Soviets do not face starvation, but they face yet
another cut in per capita meat consumption that is already
low. Meat consumption is a primary indicator of the well-
being of the population; its reduction in 1982 represents
another unfulfilled commitment from the Brezhnev leadership
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The first tradeoff is supported by the realities of civil
unrest in Poland and the willingness of other states such as
Hungary and Czechoslovakia to risk open ideological deviance
to improve their economies. Indochina is not the cause of the
socialist malaise but its absorption of resources exacerbates
the trade and financial problems of the bloc.
The second tradeoff requires the Soviets to prioritize
goals. Funds expended in Indochina cannot be quickly recouped.
Opportunities for stabilizing the economic situation in Poland
or forestalling Hungary's bid to join the IMF by making Soviet
funds available have already been lost. Current events indicate
that prioritization has occurred: 1.2 billion dollars were
provided to Poland recently and the Poles were able to pay
back $500 million in interest on rescheduled loans; Vietnam
has had to default on a 500 million dollar payment due Japan.
[Anderson, 12 April 1982:41]
The problem for the Soviets is to determine in what
quantity and for how long Eastern Europe will demand resources
otherwise available for Indochina. A seed for discord exists
between the long term requirements of the Soviet and East
European economies and the Vietnam's Foreign Minister's state-





Soviet military expenditures in Indochina surpass the
amount of economic aid provided to Vietnam and the other
Indochinese states.- Of the estimated 8.9 billion dollars
worth of aid provided between 1976 and 1981, 4.9 was spent
on military support. The tonnage delivered doubled in 1977-
78, and 1979 was 50 percent greater than 1978. [Pike, 1979:
1160-66] Soviet military assistance has allowed Vietnam
to maintain a 1.1 million man army, fourth largest in the
world, and occupation troops in Laos and Kampuchea numbering
between 210,000 and 250,000.
Vietnam has no arms industry and could not maintain its
present military commitments without massive external aid.
["USSR and Vietnam," Pike, 1979:255] The stockpiles of
American arms captured by the North Vietnamese in 1975 are
dwindling, and transportation of arms and other materials
is largely accomplished by Soviet rather than captured
American aircraft. Soviet AN-26 and AN- 12 aircraft directly
supported' the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea, making up to
thirty flights per day. [Pike, 1979:1164-66]
The Soviets directly participate in Vietnamese operations
TU-95D reconnaissance aircraft fly from airfields in Vietnam
over the conflict areas in Kampuchea and near China, pre-
sumably sharing some of their intelligence finds with the
Vietnamese. In mid-1979 there were about 5,000 Soviet
55

advisors serving in Vietnam. [Pike, 1979:1164] Today there
are an estimated 8,000 throughout Indochina. [Weintraub, 28
December 1981:1; FBIS, 10 March 1982-.J1]
Thai sources report that Soviet engineering corps troops
are in Kampuchea building bridges and roads. [FBIS, 4 May
1982 :J6] The Voice of Democratic Kampuchea (VODK) , a radio
broadcast controlled by the anti-Vietnamese forces in Kampuchea,
has reported that Soviet troops have been directly involved in
chemical operations. They also claim several Soviets have been
killed in Khmer Rouge engagements with the Vietnamese. [FBIS,
20 May 1981;H4]
The type and quantity of Soviet military aid delivered to
Vietnam has changed over time. Immediately after the unifica-
tion, supplies consisted mostly of small arms and ammunition
designed to control the populace newly 'liberated' in the
South. When the Vietnamese prepared and launched their offen-
sive against Cambodia the Soviets switched the type of aid
provided to include artillery, helicopters, armored personnel
carriers, and other equipment needed for that type of war.
Deliveries of this second type of aid continue today. [FBIS,
4 May 1982 :J6] A third type of aid has been added in roughly
the last year that confirms Vietnam's position in the Soviet
collective security system. The aid includes warships and
strengthened defenses around Cam Ranh Bay and other important
Soviet installations. More interesting is evidence that
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joint planning may be taking place between the Soviet mili-
tary and the People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) . The planning
is mostly Soviet and the design is to have the PAVN forces
act as an adjunct to Soviet forces in the event of a major
war with China.
*
The Department of Defense booklet Soviet Military Power
designates Vietnam as a major Soviet arms client and as hav-
ing major concentrations of Soviet and East European military
advisors. [September 1981:84-85] The East German military
attache in Vietnam stated "many infantry officers from our
country have actually assisted the Vietnamese Army in build-
ing the technical NCO school... in Ho Chi Minh city and for-
mulating its teaching and training to become lecturers and
instructors in the Vietnamese Army." [FBIS, 3 March 1982:
K13]
In the past 18 months Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and
Hungary have sent military delegations to Indochina. Pledges
of mutual support were made, e.g., "consolidate and strengthen
the relations between the nations and armies of Laos and
Hungary and to give long term assistance to each other."
[FBIS, 21 April 1982:11-13] Exactly what and how much aid is
provided by the East European nations is not clear. The evi-
dence suggests that the commitment is growing.
3
Based on an interview with Professor Douglas Pike, former
American Foreign Service Officer. He served in Vietnam from
1960-1970 and is currently at the Institute of East Asian




How much do Soviet and East European military expendi
tures in Indochina limit Soviet military options in Europe
and elsewhere? Probably very little. The Soviet Union has
4.8 million men under arms. They have more tanks, aircraft,
and artillery pieces than any state on earth. Their airlift
and sealift capability are equalled only by the United States
[ Soviet Military Power , 1981:3-4] In 1980 approximately 20
percent of the Soviet gross national product (GNP) was ex-
pended in support of the Soviet military. [Scott and Scott,
1981:379] The 8,000 advisors, military aid and equipment
provided to Vietnam represent marginal costs to the Soviet
military machine in return for the advantages of having
facilities in Indochina.
The military expenditures are more significant when
lumped together with economic aid figures. The total amount
represents a tremendous loss in opportunity costs. There are
other costs engendered by the Soviet military presence and
support for Vietnam. These are difficult to quantify but
very important: political costs. Political costs affect
Soviet relations in the region and, as in the case of illegal
chemical warfare, could have international repercussions.
The political costs of the Soviet involvement in Indochina
may, in the long run, be more damaging to Soviet interests




According to the Soviets, many lives have been saved by
the food provided to Vietnam by the Soviets. The power plants
and mineral extraction projects offered by the Soviets repre-
sent a serious effort to transform Vietnam into a modern,
developed state. Throughout Indochina the Soviets are build-
ing roads and providing aid that in the long run will help to
integrate Indochina into the world community. The problem
with this rosy picture is that with Soviet aid has come a
large Soviet military presence coupled with support of
Vietnam's military adventures. This military aid is clearly
to support the joint goals of the Soviets and Vietnamese in
Southeast Asia.
The Soviets and Vietnamese have seriously damaged their
relations with non-Communist nations, especially those in
ASEAN, by their military involvement in Kampuchea. Each of
the ASEAN states has publicly announced its desire for
Vietnamese troops to leave Kampuchea in order to relieve
tensions in the region and as a prerequisite for establish-
ing good relations with Vietnam. The Vietnamese, however,
have steadfastly refused to take part in any international
conference on Kampuchea that would condemn their position
or call for United Nations supervised elections in Kampuchea
designed to elect a legitimate government.
The Vietnamese aggression has resulted in a unified stand
on the part of the ASEAN nations. While maintaining they are
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not a military alliance, other rudimentary forms of aid and
support have been agreed upon by member states, in the event
one of them is attacked. Philippine President Marcos has
stressed the need for a negotiated settlement and called on
other nations such as Japan to use its influence to pressure
Vietnam into a compromise.
The Singapore Prime Minister, Lee Kuan Yew, has bluntly
stated, "Vietnam needs to make peace with her neighbors and
call off the confrontation with China. To do this she must
withdraw from Kampuchea." [FBIS, 27 July 1981:02] Pacific
basin nations such as Australia have determined that no aid
be given to Vietnam until its military forces are removed
from Laos and Kampuchea. The Australian Parliament has also
decided to support policies that would result in the inde-
pendence of Vietnam, Laos, and Kampuchea based on democratic-
ally elected governments. The nations condemning the Vietnamese
are fully aware that only Soviet support makes the occupation
of Laos and Cambodia possible.
Soviet prestige is at a low ebb in the region. In 1981
Indonesia's Vice-President, Adam Malik, stated "The Soviet
Union now represents the greatest threat to the area because
it is helping Vietnam realize Ho Chi Minh's old dream of a
single Southeast Asian Communist grouping." [Talbott, 1981:
106] The image of the Soviets was not improved when the
United Nations conference called for by the ASEAN states
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was boycotted by Vietnam with open Soviet support. The
Vietnamese-Soviet counter proposal for a regional confer-
ence to discuss security issues was rejected by ASEAN. The
Malaysian Foreign Minister stated that the proposal could
not resolve the major problem of Kampuchea and that it con-
flicted with United Nations resolutions dealing with
Kampuchea. Indonesia's Foreign Minister reported that
ASEAN' s stand against such a conference could not be reversed
by Soviet support for the proposals. [FBIS, 26 February 1981:
Nl]
Soviet military forces based in Indochina have raised
fears in the region and beyond, making an American presence
more welcome to some. Australian Prime Minister Malcombe
Fraser has commented on the danger posed by Soviet Backfire
bombers based in Vietnam because of their ability to strike
Australian cities with only one refueling. The new threat
is being considered in Australian Air Force tactical planning
and, more worrisome for the Soviets, weighs heavily in a new
agreement between Australia and the United States allowing
B-52 aircraft to make servicing stops at Darwin. [FBIS, 17
March 1981 :M1] Singapore's Lee Kuan Yew has been the most
vocal about the dangers of a too precipitous pullout of
American forces from Asia- -a fear far more prevalent after
1975. The ASEAN nations have accepted and probably appre-
ciate America's more active role in the region in the last
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few years as a counterweight to the growing Soviet power
and to further Vietnamese aggression. [Talbott , 1981:104-197]
The Soviet military presence in Indochina has significantly
increased the pressure for Japan to rearm, with all the rami-
fications that has for the global military balance. Some 58
members of the Japanese Diet recently issued a statement call-
ing for an amendment to the Japan-United States security agree-
ment, noting that it is the duty of the Japanese people to
contribute to the formation of a peaceful world order. The
statement reasoned:
"At a time when the area of operations of the Soviet
Pacific Fleet is expanding to the Indonesian peninsula
and when there is a growing fear for the safety of our
sea lanes, is it not time for us to show our willingness
to shoulder our responsibilities to defend ourselves
and to protect our sea lanes..." [Wall Street Journal ,
19 April 1982:23]
The United States is pressuring the Japanese to increase
their defense spending. It is an open question whether the
long term interests of either the Soviet Union or the United
States will be served by a more fully rearmed Japan; there
is no question that if the Japanese chose to rearm the Soviet
threat in Indochina will play a major role in the decision.
The degree of Soviet involvement in Vietnam associates it
with the many internal problems Vietnam is suffering. Despite
seven years of substantial Soviet aid, Vietnam today hardly
represents a model of Communist success. Soviet aid has yet
to produce a Vietnam capable of feeding its own population.
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Current economic conditions are reported to be much worse
than they were in 1975. Many factories have closed and the
people have less to eat than they did during the war. [Doan
Van Toai, 24 March 1982:24]
In April 1982, the Wall Street Journal reported that
Vietnam continues to hold approximately 126,000 people in
"reeducation camps" described as similar to concentration
camps in conditions of existence and brutality. It is not
uncommon for a new Communist nation to deal brutally with
non-conformists and the situation in Vietnam highlights the
fact that totalitarian methods have not changed since the
Soviets fine-tuned the arts of repression in the 1920s and
30s. The Wall Street Journal editorial stated "The reeduca-
tion camps don't appear to have yet approached the ferocity
of the Soviet gulag, where tens of millions lost their lives
in post-Revolutionary Russia." [8 April 1982:20]
Soviet-Vietnamese labor exchange relations have been
treated skeptically in Western reports. In an effort to
balance the trade deficit with the Soviet Union and perhaps
to increase the number of trained workers, thousands of
Vietnamese have been sent to Russia to work in Soviet fac-
tories. Their length of stay will be five to six years.
The Vietnamese will be paid and treated as Soviet workers
according to the agreement, with part of their pay going
toward the interest payments on Vietnam's debt. Vietnamese
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and Soviet sources acknowledge the existence of the agreement
but state the workers are to "receive vocational training and
improve their professional skills... and become an enlightened
and trained work force of the Vietnamese working class." [FBIS,
16 April 1982:K2]
The Western media have labeled it slave trade, placed the
projected number of workers involved at 500,000, and indicated
that many workers will go to Siberia. One radical view links
the extension of Western credit for the Siberian gas pipeline
to the importation of slave labor to lay the pipe because of
the Soviet manpower shortage. [Wall Street Journal , 3 May 1982:
28] The truth probably lies between the Soviet-Vietnamese and
Western versions. The Soviets pay a political price regardless
of the truth because, except for deported slave labor, there
is little precedent for the Soviet-Vietnamese labor exchange
accord.
1 . Political Tradeoffs
Some Soviet political costs are related to economic
aid: Eastern Europe faces limits on its ability and willing-
ness to support external commitments, Indochina taxes those
limits. A larger political cost stems from the perception
of the Soviets in the non- Communist world. There is a possi-
bility that the cumulative effect of the Polish Crisis,
Afghanistan invasion, and Soviet actions in Indochina could
reinforce the long held American image of the Soviet Union
as an international renegade.
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The West European printed news media seem to have
taken scant notice of Soviet involvement in Indochina.*
The most serious critique only indirectly assailed the
Soviets. The European Community, represented by the
Foreign Minister of Great Britain, lent its support to
ASEAN demands that Vietnam withdraw from Kampuchea and bona
fide elections be held to form a new government. [Leapman,
16 July 1981 :6h] Other articles condemning the Vietnamese
gulag and the alleged use of chemical warfare have also
appeared. [Moorehead, 6 April 1981 :5gj; Kelley, 27 October
1981:6h]
There was no indication that a linkage between Soviet
activities in Indochina and a more strident anti-Soviet stance
either in the media commentary or in statements of government
leaders. This does not mean that there is not concern, public
and official, about events in Indochina and the Soviet role
in the region.
There is evidence linking Western Europe's image of
the Soviets with Russia's external involvements. A Per
Spiegel poll taken in November 1981 noted:
£
Research included review of all 1981 West European FBIS
and 1981 London Times. Also reviewed October 1981 through
April 1982 German Tribune, English language summary of events
and official statements in West Germany. Representative of
German Information Center in New York City stated that no
poll had been taken in West Germany to determine a link




"The image most Germans have of the Soviet Union is
still influenced by the occupation of Afghanistan.
Only 11 percent think Moscow will withdraw its troops
from the country. The majority (59 percent) assumes
Afghanistan will become an Eastern bloc state. And
26 percent even expect the Soviets not only to stay
in Afghanistan, but to 'invade other countries from
that state." [23 November 1981:68]
Obviously stark differences exist between the Soviet
involvement in Afghanistan an its involvement in Indochina.
The Afghanistan invasion employed Soviet troops in direct
aggression with no pretense of proxies. The Soviet emplace-
ment in Afghanistan represents a significant threat to West
Europe's interests because of the proximity of Middle East
oil resources
.
There is nothing openly aggressive or illegal in the
Soviet Union's activities in Vietnam, which cannot be said
of Afghanistan. The situation could change if multiple
sources outside the United States confirm the use of chemical
warfare in Indochina or the Soviets become more directly in-
volved in the guerrilla war in Kampuchea and Laos.
The Soviet involvement in Indochina may have an immea-
surable effect on public opinion in Western Europe. The Per
Spiegel poll also found that 73 percent of those questioned
felt that the Soviet Union was attempting to attain military
superiority and 40 percent--the largest percentage agreeing
to any of the choices offered- - felt that the Soviets wished
to attain military superiority in order to expand their domain
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Overall, however, there is little evidence that Soviet activ-
ities in Indochina damage their image or represent a signif-
icant political cost in Western Europe
.
D . SUMMARY
Three areas of Soviet commitments and related costs in
Indochina have been presented: economic, military, and polit-
ical. Economic expenditures and costs are high relative to
limited Soviet resources and Vietnam has little ability to
repay its debts. The military costs, while significant, prob-
ably do not limit Soviet military options in other parts of
the world. Military and economic costs added together are
very expensive in terms of lost opportunity costs. In Eastern
Europe these costs may be translated into an inability either
to bolster Poland's economy before it reached the point of
collapse or to provide sufficient economic inventives to
Hungary and Czechoslovakia to prevent their taking steps
toward economic liberalization.
Military expenditures in support of Vietnam and the vis-
ible deployment of Soviet forces have created political costs
for the Soviets both regionally and globally. The ASEAN nations
have condemned the Vietnamese and the Soviets for the situation
in Kampuchea. The non-Communist Pacific Basin states are in
general more willing to accept American power in the region as
a counter to the Soviet intrusion. Perhaps the most important
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cost, politically and militarily, is the impetus the Soviet
presence in Indochina has given to the Japanese to consider
rearming.
The following conclusions are important to consider before
proceeding to the next and final chapter concerning American
policy options in Southeast Asia:
1. the major tradeoff between Soviet resources committed
to Indochina rather than Europe (or elsewhere) is
economic;
2. little or no military tradeoff exists except as
military expenditures add to economic costs;
3. regional political costs are incurred by the Soviet
military involvement in Indochina in the form of
anti-Soviet feelings and increased support for an
American counterweight. There is little evidence
that these costs are transferable to Europe.
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IV. AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY OPTIONS
American foreign policy has several broad goals: estab-
lish global stability, i.e., world peace, promote economic
and social welfare at home and abroad, and the achievement
of a world order in consonance with our own goals and ideals.
For America, peace and progress must be built on the free ex-
pression of the political will of the people in each nation.
These lofty goals may sometimes be shaded by short-term
national interest, but in the main they represent the major
themes of American foreign policy since 1945.
Some of the tools used in pursuit of these goals have been
military and economic aid to foreign nations and, when deemed
necessary, direct application of American military power. The
China Aid Act of 1948 was one of the first major aid programs
for Asia. After the start of the Korean War the United States
adopted a policy of granting aid to "reinforce non-Communist
governments by strengthening and broadening the basis of eco-
nomic life, improving the condition under which people live,
and showing in unmistakable ways the genuine interest of the
United States in the welfare of the people of Southeast Asia."
[Buss, 1961:376-368] More pragmatically, the military aid
program supported local troops that presumably would be used
to contain anti- government insurgents at a far lower cost
than direct American involvement.
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American policy managing these tools has changed several
times since the end of World War II. Immediately after the
war the focus was on rebuilding Europe; Asia became a serious
concern only as the conflict in China escalated. The Truman
Doctrine, announced in March 1947, the Chinese Communist vic-
tory in 1949, the Korean War, and the domestic trauma caused
by McCarthyism, all contributed to make the 1950s America's
most viciously anti- Communist period. The attitude of the
time could be labeled confrontational: any nation that
associated with either the Russian or Chinese Communists was
viewed with suspicion, no middle ground was considered fea-
sible. Neutralism or non-alignment, such as that claimed by
Nasser or Nehru, was labeled as "immoral" by Secretary of
State John Foster Dulles. [Crabb, 1972:289-290]
By the early 1960s non-alignment was no longer viewed as
a necessarily evil state. Experience had shown that non-
alignment was not tatamount to avowed emnity; a neutral would
still be friendly even if uncommitted. A reappraisal of
American foreign policy in general had begun to take place.
President Kennedy acknowledged America's limits soon after
his inauguration stating "that the United States is neither
omnipotent nor omniscient- -that we are only six percent of
the world's population- -that we cannot impose our will on the
other 94 percent of mankind- -that we cannot right every wrong
and reverse every adversity- - and that therefore there cannot
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be an American solution to every world problem." [Quoted in
Schlesinger, 1978:424] Regarding the Communists, he stated
"If we cannot put aside our differences, at least we can
help make the world safe for diversity." [Ibid., 424] The
reappraisal was arrested by Kennedy's death and the specter
of a Communist takeover in the Republic of South Vietnam.
[Halberstam, 1973]
The Vietnam War was America's first set back. The con-
duct of the war polarized the American populace and led to
a wholesale challenge of our government and our way of life:
American power had truly reached a limit. Ironically,
President Nixon's pronouncement of the Guam or Nixon Doctrine
in 1969 echoed President Kennedy's earlier statements.
"The United States will participate in the defense and
development of allies and friends, but... America cannot
--and will not- -conceive all the plans, design all the
programs, execute all the decisions and undertake all
the defense of the free nations of the world. We will
help where it makes a real difference and is considered
in our interest." [Quoted in Nathan, 1981:367-368]
Under the Nixon Doctrine, American arms and aid might be
forthcoming but direct involvement of American ground forces
was unlikely. Non-Communist Asian states were expected to
provide the manpower for their own defense.
Following the North Vietnamese victory in 1975 and the
withdrawal of American forces from Thailand in 1976, there
was speculation that the Nixon Doctrine heralded a total
American military withdrawal from East Asia. Asian scholars
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such as Robert Scalapino were quick to point our the many-
problems such a withdrawal would cause Asia and the United
States. [1975:204-212] Without some American counterweight,
China or Russia were expected to fill the void and, through
the implicit threat of force, make their interests of more
concern to the region than those of an isolationist United
States
.
Today the fear of a total American military withdrawal
has evaporated. On his trip to Asia in June 1981, Secretary
of State Haig strongly reiterated America's determination to
stand by its security commitments to Thailand and the
Philippines. [Kam, 21 June 1981-.A12] In April 1982, Vice
President Bush affirmed the American commitment to South
Korea and stated that there would be no change in American
policy toward North Korea. [FBIS, 27 April 1982 :E1] In
Australia the Vice President called the ANZUS treaty a val-
uable contribution to the preservation of world peace.*
[FBIS, 3 May 1982 :M1] In Singapore Prime Minister Lee Kuan
Yew noted that the Vice President's visit was the second in
sixteen months, a welcome sign from the Reagan administra-
tion of American support for ASEAN. The Vice President
stated that although Singapore and the United States are
not allies in the formal sense, they both believe in the
3
Australia, New Zealand, and the United States tripartite
security agreement signed 1 September 1951.
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need for the United States to maintain "a strong and study
influence in the Pacific region." [FBIS, 28 April 1982:01-2]
In sum, America continues to support its interests, pri-
marily non-military in the Pacific, not abrogating the Nixon
Doctrine but avoiding the worst fears of its implications.
It is this America, one that sees and at least rhetorically
accepts the Soviet global challenge, that confronts the
situation in Southeast Asia and will formulate American policy
in response to it.




presence in Indochina represents the
first real naval challenge to American dominance in the
Pacific since the end of World War II. Soviet ships and air-
craft operating from installations in Vietnam are capable of
reaching most nations in Southeast Asia. Previously Soviet
aircraft could not reach the area except for long range re-
connaissance. Soviet ships no longer have to return to bases
in the Soviet Far East for resupply.* The Soviets are strate-
gically placed to cut the Middle East oil supply route to
Japan. The naval facilities in Vietnam and Kampuchea greatly
reduce the turn around time for units deployed to the Indian
Ocean. These military aspects of the Soviet involvement in
Indochina are serious; America's budding naval buildup is
designed in part to counter the threat in the Pacific.
Military implications discussed in Part I, pp. 14-16
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Admiral Noel Gayler, former Commander in Chief of United
States forces in the Pacific, wrote of the Soviet presence
in Asia:
"The Soviets can, in some circumstances, coerce any nation
dependent on overseas trade or Middle Eastern and overseas
oil
.
--They can, in some circumstances, reduce or constrain
American and allied power and their influence in Asia.
--They can make some difference in the outcome of fac-
tional strife in Asia." [1981:14]
Specifically in relation to Indochina, the Admiral stated "A
most important-
- and dangerous- -development is the new Soviet
capability to operate from Vietnam." [Ibid., p. 10] A journa-
list noted "It is argued that whoever controls Southeast Asia,
and the sea lanes which carry petroleum and raw materials to
Japan, also control's Japan's future and has the potential
to bring the country to its knees." [Tyler, 21 March 1980:33]
Japan is perhaps the United States' most crucial ally in Asia
today and the Soviet threat must be countered by American and
allied power.
The Soviet presence has another effect the Soviets may
not have intended:
"Moscow is building military power of every category at
a rate that suggests an attempt to overawe the world in
furtherance of Soviet objectives. Yet, the Soviets appear
to feel genuinely threatened in Asia by the potential al-
liance of the United States, China, and Japan. They seem
to have little insight into the fact that the conditions
for such an alliance have been created precisely by their
own military buildup and military interventions. [Gayler,
1981:8]
Vietnam represents one of the Soviets most serious interventions.
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Many of the political costs to the Soviet discussed in
Chapter II are beneficial to the United States. Soviet over-
tures to China, such as Brezhnev's latest "we are ready at
any moment to continue talks on existing border questions,"
are undermined by continued Soviet support for Vietnamese
operations in Laos and Kampuchea. [Wall Street Journal , 25
March 1982:33] Chinese Premier Deng Xiaoping has stated that
China's Vietnam policy was directed at the Soviet Union, which
he described as seeking to encircle China and secure regional
domination through the "Asian Cuba" Vietnam. [U.S. Congress,
1979:7]
The testimony of Hoan Van Hoan, former Vietnamese Central
Committee member who defected to China in 1979, supports the
Chinese view of Soviet policy. Hoan stated that Le Duan kept
the Sino-Vietnamese conflict going at Moscow's behest. The
land border between China and Vietnam is clearly delineated
and not the root of the conflict. [Chanda, 18 April 1980:7-8]
Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Han Nialong has stated "actually
there are not so many points of contradiction between China
and Vietnam itself. It is purely Vietnam's bullying of a
neighboring country with the support of the Soviet Union."
[Ibid., p. 12] The United States benefits because China is
unlikely to accept rapprochement with the Soviets at American




The negative reaction of Southeast Asian states, espe-
cially ASEAN, to Soviet power projection in the region has
been a benefit for the United States. Singapore and Thailand
have been most vocal in asking the United States to provide
aid and maintain military presence in the region. Since the
Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea in 1979 the Thais have been
especially interested in arms aid from the United States...
The Thai Prime Minister has directed his ambassador to the
United States to "lobby in the House, Senate, and State
Department, and conduct a public relations program with the
American press and public" with the objective of making
America "fully appreciate the vital role of Thailand in the
global power balance." [FBIS, 12 January 1981:11] Singapore
has publicly supported American involvement in settling the
Kampuchean problem. As early as 1976 Prime Minister Lee Kuan
Yew perceived the Soviet naval presence in the region to be
the major threat to the region. [Solomon, 1981:106, 245-249]
The other three ASEAN states, Malaysia, Indonesia, and
the Philippines, although somewhat less hardline than Thailand
and Singapore in their condemnation of Vietnam, have each sup-
ported calls for an international settlement of the Kampuchean
issue. Both Indonesia and Malaysia deny that ASEAN will ever
become a security alliance, yet both have considerably up-
graded their military forces since 1975. Most of the arms
purchased have been from Western nations.
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The United States suffers little economic cost from the
Soviet presence in Indochina. Neither the United States nor
the Soviet Union has a serious need for the resources avail-
able in the region. The Soviet Union receives very little
economic benefit from its investment in Indochina and it is
unlikely the United States would fare better were it to
assume the financial burden of Vietnam's development.
Summarizing, there are two related clusters of effects
the Soviet presence in Indochina has on America. First, the
Soviets pose a military threat to America's allies in the
region. Soviet air and naval power can reach out from bases
in Vietnam as it was unable to do from bases in Russia. The
reaction of Australia to the Backfire bombers stationed in
southern Vietnam highlights the impact of the new threat.
From Indochina the Soviets can involve themselves in the
internal disputes of neighboring nations, undermining the
American goal of regional stability. The Soviets have gained
a strategic position for undermining the fragile democratic
forms that have appeared in the ASEAN states. [Scalapino,
1975:206-210]
Second, derived from the first, the ASEAN and other Asian
states are more receptive to the employment of American in-
fluence and show of power in the region as a counterweight
to Soviet influence and power. This was evidenced by China's
gentle suggestion to the Philippines that American bases be
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allowed to remain on Philippine soil, Thailand's request for
American security support, and ASEAN' s request for American
support in resolving the Kampuchean issue.
These effects must be considered in the formation of
American policy toward Indochina and Asia in general.
B. POLICY OPTIONS
Although the options discussed below are designed to
achieve results in Southeast Asia, they cannot be divorced
from the global object of countering the Soviets. In each
option an attempt is made to link Soviet options and expend-
itures in Europe to the formation of American policy in
Southeast Asia. Three options are presented: 1. hardline;




The hardline option has economic, military, and polit
ical elements. Economic:
1. Embargo American trade with the Soviet Union;
2. Deny credit to the Soviet Union and East European
nations while declaring nations such as Poland in
default
;
3. Pressure American allies to sanction the Soviets,
deny credit to Eastern Europe, and withhold all aid
from Indochina.
The Soviets are facing a severe grain shortage and
hard currency crunch. An American grain embargo would help
make a bad situation worse. The financial crisis has been
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brought on by the relatively low world prices for oil and
gold and three years of bad harvests the Soviet Union has
suffered.
Imposing a grain embargo after the Afghanistan inva-
sion and then lifting the embargo while still pressuring our
allies for sanctions against the Soviets has seriously damaged
American credibility. Although the official reason given by
the United States for lifting the embargo was its ineffec-
tiveness, our allies perceived it as a response to domestic
pressures. The Japanese government went so far as to say it
was embarrassed by the American move because it undermined
the concerted action taken by the West against the Soviet
Union. [FBIS, 24 April 1981:C1] A complete and sustained
American embargo would improve our bargaining position with
our allies in both Europe and Asia.
The United States could exacerbate Soviet problems
by advocating actions such as declaring Poland in default
and, as President Reagan did at the Versailles Summit, ask-
ing for a curtailment of low interest loans and credits to
the Soviet. Wisconsin Senator Robert Kasten wrote recently
that by declaring Poland in default "We will force the
Russian leaders to pay the full price for the Communist
system they have imposed on their own people and those of
Eastern Europe." [Wall Street Journal , 7 May 1982:26] He
further states that the crisis in Poland offers an opportunity
to hasten the breakdown of the Soviet system.
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Eastern Europe, for reasons presented in Chapter I,
remains the first external priority for the Russian leader-
ship. A complete cutoff or substantial slowdown of Western
credit to the Eastern bloc coupled with existing financial
problems might force the Soviets to choose between their com-
mitments in Europe and at home and those it supports in places
like Indochina.
The United States already exerts pressure on its allies
to limit the amount of aid supplied to Vietnam. The object is
to have Vietnam moderate its behavior or to remain isolated
from the Western community. In June 1981 then Secretary of State
Alexander Haig clearly stated the American position: "We will
continue to question seriously and economic assistance to
Vietnam, whatever the source, so long as Vietnam continues to
squander its scarce resources for aggressive purposes."
[Leapman, 14 July 1981:14] Limiting Western aid to Vietnam
increases costs for the Soviets but is unlikely to cause the
Soviets to reconsider and reduce their commitment, however,
combining the effects of increased Soviet costs in Europe and
Indochina based on Western sanctions might force the Soviets
to reduce their commitment to Indochina.
The major hardline military element calls for— supply-
ing arms, ammunition, and funds to the anti-Vietnamese forces
in the region.
The object of this element is to increase the costs to
both the Soviets and Vietnamese of maintaining their current
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policies in Indochina. The war in Kampuchea represents a sig-
nificant drain on Vietnam's human and material resources. One
estimate puts the cost to the Soviets at 2.5 million dollars
per day to support the Vietnamese occupation. [Turley, 1980:
110] In addition to Kampuchea, there are resistance movements
in Laos and Vietnam itself. The seriousness of the movements
is indicated by the 30,000 Vietnamese troops in Laos and the
180,000 troops in Kampuchea.
There are three separate anti-Vietnamese resistance
groups in Kampuchea. The largest is the infamous Khmer Rouge,
responsible for the deaths of approximately three million
Cambodians following the defeat of the American supported Lon
Nol government in 1975 and prior to their ouster by the
Vietnamese in 1978-79. Since their defeat the Khmer Rouge
have dropped their open affiliation with Communism and taken
various other steps to repair their image. The other two
groups, the Khmer Serei nationalists led by Son Sann, and
the relatively new FUNCIPEC,* the latest group sponsored by
Prince Sihanouk, are more ideologically compatible with the
West but unfortunately much smaller organizations than the
Khmer Rouge.
The three groups formed a coalition in June 1982 with
Prince Sihanouk as President. There is little ideological
agreement between the groups. The major point of agreement
s
National United Front for an Independent, Neutral,
Peaceful and Cooperative Cambodia.

between them is that the Vietnamese must be removed from their
country. The coalition was formed at a crucial time for pre-
venting the Vietnamese backed Heng Samrin regime from gaining
the United Nations seat currently held by representatives of
the Pol Pot government. China and ASEAN strongly backed the
formation of the coalition as an important step toward creat-
ing an alternative political unit to the Vietnamese regime.
The coalition also offers a convenient focus for the supply
of military and other forms of aid.
The costs of the war in Kampuchea could be increased
if the United States chose to support the anti-Vietnamese
forces both militarily and diplomatically. American aid has
been sought by all three groups forming the coalition. In
April 1981 Son Sann announced his intention to approach the
Reagan administration for aid, stating "We do not lack man-
power but we are short of guns and ammunition." [FBIS, 20
April 1981 :H6] When Prince Sihanouk formed FUNCIPEC he
assigned a former Cambodian Premier, In Tarn, the task of
seeking aid from Washington. In Tarn supposedly will be re-
sponsible for forming a nationalist army for the new govern-
ment. At the time, Sihanouk stated "If Beijing and Washington
give us nothing it will be easy to put us down." Later in an
Agence France-Press interview he asked for aid to form an in-
dependent Sihanoukist army and stated that he could raise an
army "with as many as 100,000 men." [FBIS, 27 March 1981 :H1]
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The anti-Vietnamese forces in Laos are far fewer in
number than those in Kampuchea. In 1981, these forces received
some notice when former Lao Premier Phoumi Nosavan agreed to
lead the movement, but his record gives him little credence as
a leader. Nosovan stated there were approximately 20,000 anti-
Vietnamese guerrillas in Laos and that since September 1980
Lao and Kampuchean forces had been collaborating. The meeting
that initiated the collaboration supposedly was also attended
by FULRO* representatives, tribal rebels from Central Vietnam.
[FBIS, 24 July 1981:11]
How effective are these forces as military units?
Effective enough to cause some 200,000 Vietnamese troops to
be stationed in Laos and Kampuchea. Could these resistance
forces militarily expel the Vietnamese? Probably not, even
with substantial Chinese and American aid. One estimate of
the total number of anti-Vietnamese troops is sixty-five
thousand, it could be much lower .** [Ibid.
,
p. 11] Prince
Sihanouk has stated he could raise a large force, yet his
forces are the smallest of the three factions.
Military aid could perhaps make a difference in any
attempt to reach a political compromise between the Heng Samrin
regime, the Vietnamese, and the Sihanoukist coalition. Ample
*Front Uni Pour La Lutte de Races Opprimees
.
This estimate includes 30-40,000 Khmer Rouge guerrillas.
A more recent estimate puts their total at 20-30,000. [ Far
Eastern Economic Review, 2 July 1982:10-11]
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military supplies might raise the level of violence somewhat,
changing the style as well as the cost of the war. Most
attacks by the anti-Vietnamese forces are hit and run- -blowing
up buses, damaging rail lines- -most major actions are initiated
by the Vietnamese. The guerrillas have no defense against
Vietnamese artillery. More and heavier weapons will be re-
quired if the anti-Vietnamese forces wish to change the nature
of the war.
Support for Sihanouk and the possibility of his return
to power could undermine the legitimacy of the Vietnamese in-
stalled Samrin government and pressure the Vietnamese to accept
some form of coalition. The Prince is still popular with the
peasants. Far Eastern Economic Review reported that "The mere
name of Prince Norodom Sihanouk. . . seems to cause the Vietnamese
more political problems than all the activities of the paras."*
[Quinn- Judge, 9 April 1982:30] He has the international recog-
nition to attract Western aid and Chinese support. The
Vietnamese are wary of accepting any compromise or coalition
involving Sihanouk because they might face similar demands for
concessions in Laos - -loosening their control of the Indochinese
buffer states. [Turley, 1980:110] American support could im-
prove Sihanouk's bargaining position.
The Vietnamese face other problems in the Kampuchean
war that American aid could greatly exacerbate. In April 1981
35




the Vietnamese 341st Division was relieved of duty in the area
it had been stationed north of Phnom Penh because of its high
desertion rate and substandard performance. Most of the troops
in the Division were from South Vietnam. [ Far Eastern Economic
Review
,
24 April 1981:9] The problem is not new. Vietnamese
troops in Kampuchea are poorly supplied and forced to grow and
scrounge most of their food. Desertions, especially among
southern troops, have been frequent. Approximately 3000
Vietnamese soldiers crossed into Thailand in 1980. [McBeth,
13 June 1980:43-44]
A Vietnamese captain who defected to Thailand reported
low morale among the troops and decreasing cooperation from the
Kampuchean people. Food shortages have been reported by many
defectors and several have related it to the famine conditions
that exist in Vietnam. [FBIS, 10 July 1981:J3; 29 July 1981:J2]
American aid to the guerrillas would intensify the fighting,
causing more casualties, increasing the shortages in Vietnam,
and creating even greater supply problems for the troops in
the field.
The political elements of the hardline approach are
as follows:
1. provide diplomatic support, i.e., vote in the United
Nations for the Sihanouk coalition to receive aid and
retain the Cambodian seat in the name of the Khmer Rouge.
2. continue to make Soviet involvement in Vietnamese mis-
deeds an
Kampuchea
international issue, e.g., chemical warfare in
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Diplomatic and military support for the anti-Vietnamese
forces increases the political problems for both the Russians
and Vietnamese. A widened war in Kampuchea would further
damage the Soviet image in the region. The Vietnamese cannot
sustain a high level of combat without Soviet support. The
Vietnamese might feel pressured, in the face of an expanded
military effort and a more serious political challenge, to
increase their use of chemical weapons and make more breaches
of the Thai border— acts which cause a negative world reaction
and serve only to sustain Vietnam's isolation from the West
and ASEAN.
The increased costs of a more intense struggle in
Cambodia would lead to increased domestic shortages and a re-
duction of the already low standard of living endured by the
Vietnamese citizens. Greater internal repression might be
required within Vietnam, leading to an increase in the number
of refugees. All of these effects are possible if the United
States extends political and military support to the anti-
Vietnamese coalition.
An increase in the intensity and worldwide attention
given to the Kampuchean conflict could find the Soviets in
conflict with their European clients. Already displeased
with the support they are pressured into providing, the East
European nations might attempt to pressure Moscow, with such
leverage as they have, to settle the conflict rather than
continue supporting Vietnam's war in Kampuchea. In this
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perspective, Vietnam is just another unwelcome addition to an
already expensive number of external commitments such as Cuba
that the East Europeans support.
In sum, a hardline American option would attempt to
overstress the Soviet economy by increasing the costs of its
external commitments. In Europe the tactic would be to deny
further credit to the Eastern bloc and to limit East-West
trade as much as possible. The tactic in Indochina would be
both economic and military: deny aid to Vietnam and support
the anti-Vietnamese forces in Laos and Kampuchea. Political
pressure could be applied by making major issues of the
chemical warfare in Indochina and Afghanistan, refugee prob-
lems in Indochina, and the internal repression associated
with the Soviet and Vietnamese regimes.
2 . Low Key
The objective of this alternative approach is to
weaken Soviet- Indochinese ties using diplomacy and economic
aid and trade supported by a strong but not overbearing
American military presence in the region. The major elements
of this option would be:
1. direct humanitarian aid to Indochina, e.g., foodstuffs,
and normalization of relations with Vietnam;
2. increased economic, diplomatic, and military support
for ASEAN, including the possibility of an American
security guarantee;
3. solidification of our relationship with China, i.e.,
more trade and aid, military assistance;
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4. support for liberalizing steps in East European nations
such as those attempted in Hungary and Czechoslovakia.
Four assumptions support this option. First, the basis of
the Soviet-Vietnamese relationship is Vietnam's extreme depend-
ence on the Soviet Union- -when that dependence is reduced or
their goals diverge sufficiently, the relationship will quickly
deteriorate. Second, the Vietnamese mean what they say, i.e.,
their troops will leave Kampuchea when the threat they perceive
from China is alleviated. Third, the Taiwan issue can be re-
solved in a manner satisfactory to both the Nationalist and
mainland Chinese. Fourth, Japan and the United States can
make it in China's interest to negotiate a treaty with Vietnam.
Vietnam's autonomy is suspect in light of its almost
complete dependence on Soviet aid, yet their sustained dedica-
tion to that autonomy is the most vital assumption of this
approach. Jean Lacouture, author of Ho Chi Minh : A Political
Biography
,
describes the Vietnamese as having "A desire for
autonomy which has remained unimpaired throughout the cruel
vicissitude of the war [and] is not likely to be weakened by
the burdensome difficulties of the peace." [1973:571]
Many experienced observers feel that the Soviet-
Vietnamese relationship is not a durable one. The cultural
differences between the Vietnamese and the Russians and the
fiercely independent nature of the Vietnamese are cited as
the most likely causes of the eventual split. Vietnam's
leaders know that Vietnam is a pawn in the larger game of
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the Sino-Soviet conflict and the global confrontation between
the Soviet Union and the United States. The Vietnamese have
not forgotten that the Soviets cordially received President
Nixon at the height of the 1972 Christmas bombing of Hanoi.*
They were dismayed at recent Soviet peace overtures to the
Chinese, made at the same time China was branded as Vietnam's
"direct and most dangerous enemy." [Chanda, 2 April 1982:14-15]
Vietnam has attempted to lessen its dependence on the
Soviet Union by endeavoring to establish closer relations with
the United States. Several times improved relations seemed
to be close at hand, only to be delayed by America's normal-
ization with China and then indefinitely postponed following
Vietnam's invasion of Kampuchea. One analyst wrote in 1978
"Vietnam is determined to establish diplomatic relations with
the U.S. in order to lessen her dependence on the Soviet Union
as well as to head off U.S. -Chinese collaboration against Hanoi."
[Porter, 1978:230]
The United States can take several steps unilaterally
that would give Vietnam some flexibility in its relationship
with the Soviets. The first step would be to begin normaliza-
tion of diplomatic relations. The United States accomplished
little by waiting until 1933 to establish normal diplomatic
relations with the Soviet Union and less by waiting thirty
years after the 1949 Revolution to normalize relations with
35
The bombings broke a deadlock in American-Vietnamese
negotiations and led to the Paris Accords of 1973.
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the Peoples Republic of China. Withholding normalization will
not moderate Vietnamese actions and denies the United States
access to the country and the opportunity to at least establish
a dialogue. Most importantly, Vietnam will always have some
influence on the rest of Indochina. The United States cannot
alter that fact by non-recognition.
The second step would be the offer of American human-
itarian aid without preconditions. This step would undermine
one of Hanoi's major propaganda tools, i.e., blaming internal
problems on the machinations of the United States. If Hanoi
would accept such aid without unreasonable preconditions,
sufficient American aid would help reduce Vietnam's dependence
on the Soviets.
Despite Russian aid, Vietnam's economy is a shambles.
Its military efforts in Kampuchea have failed to provide secu-
rity and today Vietnam remains isolated from the West and the
aid offered by that community. Since January 1982 Vietnam has
taken several steps to improve its status in the West. Nguyen
Co Thach, Vietnam's Foreign Minister, recently visited nations
in Western Europe on a good will tour designed to procure aid
and improve Vietnam's image. [Chanda, 19 February 1982:20-22;
16 April 1982:17-18] Thach has announced some new steps Vietnam
is willing to take that appear more moderate than their position
several years ago. He stated Vietnam would consider joining
ASEAN "if ASEAN countries agree" and has reaffirmed that Vietnam
would withdraw from Kampuchea if a treaty could be signed with
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China. He also stated Vietnam would agree to a partial with-
drawal if there was an agreement with Thailand and indicated
a willingness to establish a demilitarized zone along the
Thai -Cambodian border subject to international supervision.
[FBIS, 6 May 1982:K1]
Thach's proposals do not offer anything drastically
new; however, they may be a sign that the Vietnamese leader-
ship retains some of the pragmatism it showed under Ho Chi
Minh. Internally the Vietnamese have taken some pragmatic
steps, albeit born of necessity, to recruit party members who
are technically competent and efficient managers as well as
ideologically safe. Many Party members have been purged and,
much as it did following the land reform fiasco of the fifties,
the leadership placed at least part of the blame for Vietnam's
many internal problems on Party shortcomings.
In Le Due Tho ' s address to the Vietnamese Party
Congress in March 1982 he stated:
"The recent shortcomings in economic work have clearly
shown that after defining the general line and the eco-
nomic line, the party should have adopted a socio-eco-
nomic strategy to serve as the guideline for determining
economic structures and building socio-economic plans
satisfactorily. It should also have adopted a correct
management system to ensure that the lines are reflected
in real life and, on this basis, are implemented ever
more profoundly." [Address VCP Cong., FBIS, 9 April 1982:
Kl]
The implication is that the party is fallible, mistakes have
been made, and the leadership acknowledges them. This inter-
nal criticism and signs of some external moderation indicate
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that the Vietnamese may still be realists and adaptable-
-
traits that might be exploited by the United States in any
attempt to reach a settlement in the region.
Vietnam has repeatedly stated it would withdraw its
troops from Kampuchea if the Chinese will sign non-aggression
treaties with the Indochinese states. The Chinese are willing
to negotiate with Vietnam but so far the meetings have produced
nothing. The Chinese say that Vietnam must withdraw its troops
from Cambodia in order for relations to improve and the
Vietnamese have stated they will not withdraw until the treaty
is signed, i.e., China accepts the situation. This standoff
might be marginally affected by unilateral American action--
improve relations with China and perhaps , through aid and an
increased United States military presence in Asia, reduce
Chinese fears of facing the Soviets without allies.
Chinese and American policies toward Vietnam are
similar. Prime Minister Zhao Ziyang has stated that pressure
of every type would be exerted by China on Vietnam to come to
the conference table. [FBIS, 5 February 1981 :J3] The Chinese
maintain military pressure along Vietnam's northern border
and have offered arms, training and sanctuary to Lao and
Cambodian guerrillas. [Nations, 8 May 1981:12] It is quite
likely that a sustained Vietnamese invasion of Thailand would
prompt the Chinese into another attack on North Vietnam.
In June 1981 the American Assistant Secretary of State
Richard Holbrook stated that Vietnam would not change its
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policies even if it did get what it wanted "So we will seek,
if we can, to find ways to increase the political, economic,
and, yes, military pressures on Vietnam, working with others
and ways which will bring about, we hope, some changes in
Hanoi's attitude toward the situation." [Chanda, 26 June 1981:
10-12]
Presently there is no clash between American and
Chinese goals in the region. China wishes to force Vietnam
to reappraise its interests, loosen its ties with the Soviet
Union, and return to its traditional independence from both
Moscow and Beijing. The overall goal is to eliminate the
threat on its southern border. [Tucker, 1980:104] America
would like to stabilize the region by resolving the Kampuchean
issue; i.e., get the Vietnamese to withdraw, stop the flow of
illegal refugees , and errode the Soviet presence in the region
The rough agreement in aims between the United States and
China represents an opportunity for concerted action in nego-
tiations with Vietnam; however, a third critical partner could
help set the tenor of those negotiations: Japan.
American interests would be well served by including
Japan as a partner in any efforts to improve relations with
China or find a solution in Indochina. Japan is an Asian
power that has long term interest in the area's development
and stability. Japan today enjoys reasonably good relations
with many Asian states and has the economic resources to sup-
port those relations with practical assistance.
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In the ten years of Sino- Japanese rapprochement there
have been many joint economic undertakings and the process is
slowly expanding. The two nations have held diplomatic con-
sulations to discuss the problems in Asia, including Indochina.
In the latest Sino-American disagreement over Taiwan, the
Japanese Foreign Minister offered to play a role in promoting
better relations between the United States and China and he
indicated that the Japanese government would "exert its efforts
toward better U.S. -Chinese ties when the Japan and Chinese
Prime Ministers exchange visits later this year." [FBIS, 26
March 1982 :C2] Although the Foreign Minister later ruled out
any mediation role for Japan in the dispute, the proposal it-
self indicates that Japan feels close enough to both parties
to attempt such mediation. The Japanese also acknowledged
that any rift between the United States and China would have
serious consequences for Japan. [FBIS, 14 April 1982 :C1]
Japan has also established limited economic contacts
with the nations in Indochina. There is a Japanese Council
of Trade with Kampuchea and a memorandum was signed in 1980
whereby Japan would import Cambodian kapok. Other items are
under consideration for import such as lumber, natural rubber,
and spices. A Japanese machinery and trade fair is scheduled
to be held in Phnom Penh in 1983. [Ogura, 1981:17] Under
United Nations auspices Japan will provide economic develop-
ment aid to Laos totalling 220,000 dollars in 1982. [FBIS,
24 February 1982 :C4]
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Japanese support would add credibility and legitimacy
to any Indochinese settlement and to any wider effort to pro-
mote non-superpower dominated regionalism. Japan has the
third largest industrialized economy in the world behind the
United States and the Soviet Union. They could be important
partners in helping to meet China's requests for cooperation
in energy, industrial, and technological development: coopera-
tion steps outlined as some of those necessary to improve Sino-
American relations. [Huan, 1981:35-53] A partnership between
the United States, Japan, and ASEAN offers the best chance of
promoting peaceful, continuous development in both North and
Southeast Asia, development which is the best defense against
either Soviet or Vietnamese intriques.
ASEAN is another essential element in any long range
Southeast Asian settlement. The association has developed con-
siderably since its formation in 1967. One of the biggest fac-
tors in welding its cohesion was the removal of American power
from Indochina and the realization that the threat posed by
Vietnam and the Soviet intrusion would have to be met under
the conditions of the Guam Doctrine. An important part of its
development has been its increasing status as an economic organ
ization. Strobe Talbott, diplomatic correspondent for Time
magazine, wrote of ASEAN.
"it has generally used its influence in ways favorable to
the economic and political interests of the industrialized
democracies. ASEAN has helped to stimulate brisk trade and
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growing prosperity among the non- Communist nations of the
Pacific Basin. The organization has also served as a
point of contact between American's allies in the region
and the Non-alligned Movement, since its members include
three nonaligned states (Singapore, Maylaysia, and
Indonesia) as well as two with defense ties to the
United States. [Solomon, 1981:104-105]"
Other Pacific powers have taken a significant interest
in ASEAN economic matters. The June 1982 meeting of ASEAN
Ministers will be followed by another meeting that will in-
clude Japan's Foreign Minister plus ministers from the United
States, Canada, Australia, and officials from the European
Community. [FBIS, 18 February 1982 :C1]
Despite internal divisions, ASEAN has maintained a
relatively united front on the Kampuchean issue. They demand
that Vietnam withdraw its forces from Kampuchea and refuse to
recognize the Samrin regime. ASEAN has exerted considerable
pressure in the United Nations to insure the Samrin government
did not occupy Kampuchea's seat in the General Assembly. They
also demand that Kampuchea become a neutral and independent
state. [Solomon, 1981:243]
The internal divisions in ASEAN over the Kampuchean
issue should not be overlooked. Thailand, as the nation
closest to the Vietnamese threat, is the most adamant in
demanding Vietnam's withdrawal. Singapore and Indonesia
are as skeptical of China as they are of the Vietnamese and
feel that China represents the long term threat. Both nations
contain a significant population of overseas Chinese which
have been a serious source of domestic unrest in the past.
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They would prefer to see Chinese influence completely out of
Kampuchea and are more willing to accept the Samrin regime as
a condition for having good relations with Vietnam. The
Vietnamese have continued to foster ASEAN unity, however,
first through their invasion of Kampuchea and secondly by
their indiscrete violations of the Thai border.
American support for ASEAN accomplishes at least two
objectives. First, it lends credence to the major non-Communist
organization in Southeast Asia- -"it is strategic imperative for
the U.S. to foster the further development of ASEAN and to cul-
tivate the best possible relations with its members." [Solomon,
1981:105] Second, contributing to the prosperity of the people
of ASEAN states is probably the best defense against further
Communist subversion or radicalization of the existing govern-
ments. "Self-effacing" support for ASEAN has been and should
remain a central focus of America's Asia policy. [Ibid., p. 105]
Obviously the United States has encountered serious
image problems in the past two decades. Today, especially in
Europe but also in Asia, there are those who blur both the
images and perhaps the objectives of the United States and
the Soviet Union. Recent demonstrations in Europe condemned
not only President Reagan but were against American policy in




"Yet today it is no longer quite clear who the enemy is.
Somehow it seems immaterial that one superpower has dealt
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a heavy blow to the status quo by invading a neutral
country, whereas the other, even if haphazardly, has
been trying to restore it. Both are no longer quite
rational, both are seemingly conspiring to rob Europe
of the fruits of detente." [1981:837]
American policy in Asia and Europe must make clear who the enemy
is and why. Support for ASEAN, partnership with Japan and
Western Europe, and support for attempts to liberalize in
Eastern Europe are all part of the low key approach. Each
helps to build and to maintain an image of the United States
that is substantially different than that of the Soviet Union.
3. Minimal Involvement
The low key option represents a series of steps less
controversial than those advocated in the hardline but no less
demanding in terms of time, interest, and resources committed
by the United States. The third option involves far less com-
mitment than either of the first two and demands no significant
near term change in the situation in Indochina.
The object of this option is to have the problems in
the region resolved by the nations directly involved, i.e.,
China, Vietnam, ASEAN, Laos, and Kampuchea, with minimum
American policy input. The United States would maintain its
present military force level in Asia, stand by its decision
to neither normalize relations nor provide aid to Vietnam,
and fulfill its security commitments to Thailand and the
Philippines. Beyond these commitments, however, America
would not involve itself in the region. Two important facts
support this option: 1. America does derive some benefits
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from the present situation, and; 2. virtually no observer of
Indochinese affairs predicts the Soviet -Vietnamese relation-
ship will last.
China and ASEAN support have enabled the ant i -Vietnamese
forces to wage both a political and military battle in Laos
and Cambodia without any significant help from the United
States. The Chinese have delivered arms to Son Sann's Khmer
Serie forces and to the Khmer Rouge. Without Chinese aid it is
very doubtful armed resistance would continue. [Nations, 8 May
1982:12-13] A Thai National Security Council official stated
recently that although the Khmer forces had suffered several
defeats in the last few months they were far from defeated.
Although incapable of military victory, the anti-Vietnamese
Khmers currently tie down a large number of Vietnamese troops
and absorb Soviet and Vietnamese resources without any signif-
icant American aid.
Maintenance does not imply neglect. The commitments
discussed above would be fulfilled, arms sales, trade, and
economic assistance to ASEAN would increase. Issues such as
the 'yellow rain' should continue to be exposed and condemned.
Major initiatives, however, such as diplomatic normalization
with Vietnam and offering humanitarian aid, would not be
undertaken.
C. SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS
In summary let us examine how and how much each policy
option affects the goals of the Soviets and Vietnamese.
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First we will recapitulate the goals of both nations. The
Soviet Union has five goals it is attempting to fulfill
through its presence in Indochina. The first and perhaps
most important is to contain China by posing a legitimate
threat to its southern border. The second goal stems not
only from the Soviet's China policy but relates to the global
competition between the Soviets and the United States: access
to facilities in Indochina for Soviet military forces, espe-
cially naval. The last three goals support the growing Soviet
role as a superpower: establish itself as a regional power,
gain access to trade and raw materials, and establish strong
state to state relations with the individual Indochinese
states
.
The Vietnamese have both external and internal goals.
Their most important external goals are to counter the per-
ceived threat from China and to eliminate any remaining
threats in Indochina. To this end, Vietnam would also like
to gain recognition of the Heng Samrin regime as the legiti-
mate government of Cambodia. The Vietnamese would like to
improve their relations with the West and non-Communist Asian
states. The ultimate goal of improving relations is to in-
crease the amount of aid available to develop internally.
Vietnam faces critical agricultural and manufactures prob-
lems. Improving agriculture is a number one priority and one
means of improvement and therefore a major goal is to strengthen
100

party cadres in terms of training and dedication in order to
strengthen economic and political controls. The cadres are
also seen as a major means of accomplishing the goal of inte-
grating and socializing the recently conquered south. These
goals should serve as a reference as we examine the potential
affects of the three policy options presented.
The intensified Indochinese conflict envisioned in the
hardline option would have a very negative effect on the
Vietnamese goals of increasing agricultural and industrial
production, broadening its sources of aid, improving rela-
tions with the West, and gaining acceptance of the Heng Samrin
regime in the United Nations. Vietnam does not have the re-
sources to achieve its domestic goals and fight a major con-
flict in Kampuchea; Vietnam is not able to improve its
domestic situation with the military commitment it already
supports
.
Soviet strategic goals remain unaffected by a more costly
war in Kampuchea. Access to Vietnam's port and airdrome facil
ities would not be threatened and initially the Soviet's over-
all position might be enhanced by Vietnam's increased aid
requirements. The war in Kampuchea allows the Soviets to ful-
fill the goal of containing China by serving as a major source
of conflict between China and Vietnam.
Most regional Soviet goals would be difficult to achieve
in the environment created by the hardline approach. Econom-
ically, the Soviets would face greatly increased demand for
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aid and have less and less resources available to fulfill
them. The Soviet standing in the region would suffer from
any expanded conflict that increased the refugee and security
problems that already exist in ASEAN. Soviet attempts to
become a regional economic power are hampered by both a lack
of valuable goods to trade and the onus of supporting
Vietnamese aggression. The only regional goal that might
benefit would be the Soviet attempt to establish closer state
to state relations with Laos and Cambodia because both states
would become even more dependent on Soviet bloc aid.
The low key option would help fulfill Vietnam's domestic
economic goals by freeing some of their resources for develop-
ment and by helping to relieve some of the pressures on their
society, i.e., hunger. Normalization of relations with the
United States and humanitarian aid would fulfill Vietnam's
goals of broadening its sources of aid and improving relations
with the West.
Soviet goals would be jeopardized by any American action
that reduced Vietnam's dependence on the Soviet Union. The
Soviet position might be undermined if America could use the
low key option to change Vietnam's perception of the threat
posed by China and the United States. Humanitarian aid from
the United States coupled with normal diplomatic relations
would undercut one of Vietnam's prime propaganda ploys to




The maintenance option might serve to deny Vietnam any
improvement in its relations with the West, denying it the
opportunity to broaden its sources of aid. The option would
have little other affect on Vietnam's domestic goals than to
lengthen the time it will take to achieve them. The goals
of dominating Indochina and gaining acceptance of the Heng
Samrin regime would be unaffected because the maintenance






Indochina has become an important part of the Soviet
Union's Asian collective security system. Considerable re-
sources have been committed to each of the Indochinese states,
especially Vietnam, in an effort to solidify Soviet relations
with each state and to accomplish the strategic goals of con-
taining China and challenging the United States.
The benefits the Soviets derive from their position in
Indochina do not come without costs. The object of this thesis
has been to examine the resources committed by the Soviets to
Indochina and to what extent they affect their options in
Europe. A significant economic tradeoff has been shown to
exist between Soviet commitments to Indochina and their ability
to control Eastern Europe through economic means. The tradeoff
is potentially decisive. The billions of dollars expended in
Vietnam might have eased or prevented the current financial
crisis in the Eastern bloc countries. The Soviet Union could
have used the resources to develop its own economy or to pro-
vide aid to Eastern Europe, aid those nations have turned to
the capitalistic West to obtain.
The Soviets have moreover, incurred regional political
costs. Neither ASEAN nor Japan is pleased with the Soviet
military presence in Indochina, and one crucial consequence
could be the partial or total rearmament of Japan. Little
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tradeoff, however, appears to exist between Soviet actions in
Indochina and the European perception of the Soviet threat.
The refugee, chemical warfare, and Kampuchean issues were re-
ported by the West European media but had no visible affects
on government policy or pronouncements.*
The tradeoffs between Soviet commitments in Indochina and
those in Europe have been used analytically to help formulate
three policy options designed to erode the Soviet position in
Indochina.
Which policy option best serves the interests of the United
States: globally, regionally, and domestically?
The hardline option is likely to be perceived by our allies
as unduly provocative. Leaders such as Helmut Schmidt, former
Chancellor of West Germany, have publicly stated that there is
little possibility of moderating Soviet behavior through trade
sanctions or other acts such as stopping the flow of Western
credit.** None of our European allies are in favor of isolat-
ing the Soviets; each has economic ties with the Eastern bloc
and few believe the sanctions imposed would have any great
effect. The Soviets could improve the climate for allied
^
This author found no evidence of a political tradeoff.
More research would be required to determine if there was
absolutely no governmental response from Western European
nations; there were none that received a reasonable amount
of publicity.
**
Interview with Helmut Schmidt, This WEEK with David




cooperation against them by making an imprudent move such
as invading Poland. Without such an unlikely step the
American hardline option would receive little allied support.
A unilateral American attempt to economically damage the
Soviets through a trade embargo would result only in isolat-
ing the United States.
Intensifying the war in Kampuchea based on American aid
would probably be unfavorable in the view of friendly govern-
ments in both Europe and Asia. ASEAN wants a political reso-
lution of the conflict, not a war that could easily spillover
into Thailand and further destablilize the region. There is
the possibility Vietnam would decide to invade Thailand, risk-
ing another invasion of Vietnam by China and the possibility
of a Sino-Soviet confrontation. [Solomon, 1981:243; Simon,
1979:1181] Although China has kept a low level of arms sup-
plied to the Kampuchean guerrillas and maintains military
pressure on Vietnam's northern border, it is not likely the
Chinese leaders wish to have the level of conflict expand
to the point where either the Vietnamese or the Soviets felt
major steps were necessary to control the situation.
In short, the hardline option would receive little sup-
port in Europe, especially for the imposition of economic
sanctions, and little support in either Europe or Asia for
a wider conflict in Kampuchea.
Domestically the United States faces serious risks in any
attempt to support a conflict in Southeast Asia. The media
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reaction to El Salvador demonstates that the memory of Vietnam
is still fresh. The application of any degree of American
power is subject to considerable scrutiny and there is little
reason to believe there is any public consensus for supplying
arms to the predacious Khmer Rouge. The possibility of form-
ing such a consensus could improve if Vietnam were to overtly
threaten Thailand and the Khmer forces were to unite under an
acceptable leader.
Globally the low key option is in tune with the policies
of many of our allies. They quite understandably fear the
consequences of confrontation tactics. The low key option
calls for the United States and its allies to increase their
penetration of the Soviet-created socialist world. The other
aspect of the option, strong but not overbearing American and
Allied military power, is equally acceptable. The low key
option is a two track plan that involves (a) sufficient mili-
tary force to contain and, if necessary, destroy Soviet and
Vietnamese military forces in Asia and (b) diplomacy and
economic aid to stabilize the region and reach an eventual
rapprochement with Vietnam.
Regionally the low key option matches ASEAN wishes for a
political settlement of the Kampuchean issue, while providing
the added benefit of increased aid for the ASEAN nations.
Japan, China, and ASEAN supported the formation of an anti-
Vietnamese united front in Kampuchea. Their goal, however,
was not to create a force capable of military victory but
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to establish a non-Pol Pot/Khmer Rouge alternative to the
Vietnamese-installed Heng Samrin regime. The idea of
establishing an alternative meshes well with the diplomatic
approach envisioned in the low key option.
The maintenance option supports the status quo and is
unlikely to have any distinct global, regional, or domestic
impact. The key disadvantage is that this option is essen-
tially reactive- -the initiative is left to the regional
actors or the Soviets, who are hardly likely to have inter-
ests in mind. American interests might eventually be served
by the forces already at work in the region and the global
problems the Soviets already face trying to support their
empire. The decision to opt for the maintenance rather than
either the hardline or low key depends on the priority assigned
to undermining the Soviet position in Southeast Asia.
The low key option (see p. 78) offers the best chance of
success. Its major advantage is its reliance on one of the
United States greatest strengths in relation to the Soviets:
its ability to provide aid and trade benefits to all of
Southeast Asia. A second advantage would be its appeal to
both our Asian and European allies.
The last advantage is crucial at a time when growing
minorities in the West claim a convergence in images of the
United States and the Soviet Union. The elements of the low
key option- -diplomacy , humanitarian and development aid,
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trade- -will help convey the fact that the United States is a
superpower dedicated to peace and the emergence of a stable
world order. The other aspects of the low key option- -improved
relations with China, equal partnership with Japan, and support
for ASEAN--will make it clear that the concept of world order
favored by the U.S. does not mean military, political, or eco-
nomic dominance by the United States. Finally, the low key
option provides the opportunity to introduce Vietnam into the
process of development begun by ASEAN and to undermine Soviet
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